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Competency to stand trial cases constitute the largest percentage of
forensic referrals for clinical psychologists.  Furthermore, research suggests that
the use of forensic measures facilitates the decisions of competency made by
forensic examiners.  This study investigated the construct validity of three
competency measures: (a) the GCCT-MSH, (b) the MacCAT-CA, and (c) the
ECST with 100 adult males incarcerated at the Tarrant County Jail in Fort Worth,
TX.  Construct validity was investigated via the use of a multitrait-multimethod
research design for the three-prong conceptualization of the Dusky standard. 
Results indicated that current competency measures do an adequate job of
assessing for factual understanding, but lack construct validity for two prongs:
rational understanding and the ability to consult with counsel.  In addition, the
atypical presentation scales of the both GCCT and the ECST performed well at
screening individuals for feigning.  Finally, prediction of competency from clinical
variables was also investigated.  Psychotic symptoms and overall impairment
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   The issue of competency to stand trial has been called "the most significant
mental health inquiry pursued in the system of criminal law" (Stone, 1975, p. 200).  One
reason for its importance is the historically large numbers of defendants that are
referred annually for competency evaluations.  For example, in 1978 a total of 20,143
mentally disordered offenders were admitted to state and federal forensic institutions in
the United States.  More than 6,000 of these mentally disordered defendants were
deemed incompetent to stand trial with the  census indicating that 3,400 incompetent
offenders were incarcerated on an average day (Steadman, Monahan, Hartstone,
Davis, & Robbins, 1982).  
The number of competency referrals has increased steadily over the past few
decades.  Although defense attorneys question their client's competency in only 8%-
15% of felony cases (Hoge, Bonnie, Poythress, & Monahan, 1992), the rise in criminal
cases in the United States has led to an increase in competency referrals.  In 1982,
there was an estimated 25,000 annual referrals for competency evaluations (Steadman
et al., 1982).  By 1998, this number had doubled with an estimated 50,000 annual
referrals for competency evaluations in the United States (Skeem, Golding, Cohn, &
Berge, 1998). 
Competency evaluations have profound significance because of their influence
on court decisions and the far-ranging consequences for the defendant.  Approximately
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25% to 30% of competency referrals result in adjudication of "incompetent to proceed"
and commitment to psychiatric hospitals for treatment to restore competence (Roesch
& Golding, 1980).  The influence of competency evaluations is magnified because
criminal courts rarely disagree with the competency recommendations of mental health
professionals (Reich & Tookey, 1986).  Research has indicated that judges typically
defer to the opinions of the examiner with concordance rates often exceeding 90%
(Hart & Hare, 1992; Reich & Tookey, 1986; Williams & Miller, 1981).
The field of forensic psychology has grown exponentially in recent decades and
has had a profound effect on both the practice of clinical psychology and the
evaluations of mentally disordered defendants (Skeem & Golding, 1998).  As the
number of competency referrals has increased, so has the need for clinical
psychologists who specialize in forensic assessment and are knowledgeable of the
legal standard for competency to stand trial.  Grisso (1996) has expressed concern that
psychologists lacking specialized training in forensic psychology may depreciate the
quality of court-ordered evaluations in criminal cases.  It is this concern that underlies
the need to maintain strict adherence to the legal standards within forensic practice.      
The Legal Framework
Early in the practice of forensic psychology, legal and mental health
professionals often confused competency to stand trial with determinations of criminal
responsibility.  Hess and Thomas (1963) examined the records of individuals at Ionia
State Hospital, the majority of whom were committed as incompetent to stand trial. 
Their results indicated that the psychiatrists confused the legal standards for
competency with insanity in the vast majority of cases.  Moreover, the reports lacked
3
clarity and substantiation.  Although it was the responsibility of the psychiatrist to "offer
a scientific description of the individual to the court in a meaningful and serviceable
fashion with clear-cut substantiation of his conclusions, [they found that] the majority of
the psychiatrists' reports were empty and meaningless" (Hess & Thomas, pp. 715-716). 
The “meaningless” nature of the reports studied was a direct result of the lack of a
substantive standard for competency to stand trial prior to 1960.
The Substantive Standard
Dusky v. United States (1960) led to the development of an important change
in the standard approach towards competency evaluations by providing mental health
professionals with a substantive standard on which to base their decisions.  The Dusky
standard articulated the following:
Test of defendant's competency to stand trial is whether he has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and whether he has rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him and it is not enough that he is oriented to time and
place and has some recollection of events (Dusky v. United States, 1960, p.
788).
Two cases subsequent to Dusky v. United States (1960) added procedural
safeguards to the standard for competency to stand trial.  In Pate v. Robinson (1966),
the Supreme Court ruled that failure to provide the defendant with a hearing to
determine competency, when sufficient evidence suggested the need, is a violation of
the defendant's 6th amendment right to a fair trial.  In 1974, the Court ruled in Drope v.
Missouri that competence at the beginning of a hearing is not necessarily indicative of
competence throughout the legal proceedings.  Furthermore, the Court specified what
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evidence was relevant to whether a hearing of competency is warranted; this evidence
included a defendant's irrational behavior, demeanor at trial, and expert's prior medical
opinion (Drope v. Missouri, 1974).  
The trilogy of Dusky, Pate, and Drope upheld the criteria first established in
Dusky as the legal standard for evaluating competency to stand trial (Bonnie, 1993). 
Furthermore, subsequent cases regarding procedural protections have continued to
support this legal standard as the basis for competency evaluation.  In Godinez v.
Moran (1993), the Supreme Court specified further the legal proceedings as they
applied to competency to stand trial.  The additional safeguards were twofold: (a) the
defendant’s decision-making abilities are encompassed within the construct of
competency to stand trial, and (b) a defendant’s trial competence and competence to
plead guilty should be assessed under a single standard.  With reference to pro se
representation, Justice Thomas noted: 
the focus of the competency inquiry is the defendant's mental capacity; the
question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceeding.  By
contrast, the purpose of the "knowing and voluntary" inquiry is to determine
whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and
consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced
(p. 2687).
In summary, the bar against trying an incompetent defendant was first established in
Dusky v. United States (1960).  Subsequent cases have continued to support and
refine the legal proceedings concerning the Dusky standard.  
Conceptualizations of the Dusky Standard
Having stood the test of time, the Dusky standard is the basis for determining
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competency in the United States.  Legal scholars and clinical researchers however,
continue to differ in their conceptualizations of the Dusky standard.  The basis of the
differing models is whether the standard is two or three dimensions (Rogers,
Grandjean, Tillbrook, Vitacco, & Sewell, in press). 
Several scholars (Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin, 1997; Shuman, 1996)
conceptualize Dusky v. United States (1960) as a two prong standard.  This
conceptualization stems from a syntactical analysis of Dusky and the placement of a
hyphen in the key sentence: “...test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding - and
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him.” .  Specifically, the court’s placement of a hyphen separates the defendant’s ability
to consult with counsel from his/her factual and rational understandings of the
proceedings.  A limitation of this conceptualization is that the Dusky standard should be
conceptualized as specific elements that represent discrete abilities (Grisso, 1986). 
Combining factual understanding with rational understanding unnecessarily complicates
this conceptualization and the assessment of discrete capacities.    
The three dimensional conceptualization of the Dusky standard provided by
legal scholars (American Bar Association, 1989) centers on a supplemental standard
established by Drope v. Missouri. Specifically, a defendant’s ability to “otherwise assist
with [their] defense” was added to the previously mentioned two prong
conceptualization resulting in a three prong standard: the defendant must be able to (a)
consult with the defense counsel, (b) otherwise assist with the defense, and (c) have
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both a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings. However, it should be
noted that Drope v. Missouri and the supplemental “otherwise assist in [their] defense”
prong has been criticized as not playing an instrumental role in competency to stand
trial evaluations (Melton et al., 1997).  
Clinical researchers (Otto et al., 1998; Rogers & Grandjean, 2000) envision the
Dusky standard as having three distinct prongs by focusing on discrete abilities rather
than syntax: (a) factual understanding of the proceedings, (b) rational understanding of
the defendant’s role in those proceedings and (c) the ability to consult with counsel. 
This model of Dusky led to the development of specific forensic measures used in the
assessment of competency to stand trial (e.g., the Competency Screening Test). While
the two versus three prong models provide a basis for academic discussion, the
determination of competency depends on the conjunctive nature of the standard.  That
is, all dimensions must be utilized together because no prong is solely sufficient to
make a determination of competence (Shuman, 1994).
Rationale for Competency to Stand Trial
Both practical and theoretical rationales have been given for establishing
competency to stand trial.  On a practical basis, Weiner (1985) presented four
justifications for determining competency: (a) to safeguard the accuracy of the
proceedings, (b) to ensure procedural fairness, (c) to preserve the dignity of the legal
system, and (d) to achieve the objectives of sentencing.  Weiner’s reasons for
establishing competency facilitate one’s understanding of the need for competency
evaluations on a case level. 
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In an attempt to offer a more theoretical perspective on the necessity for
establishing competency, Bonnie (1992) identified a three-part rationale: (a) dignity, (b)
reliability, and (c) autonomy.  According to Bonnie, trying a defendant who lacks a moral
understanding of wrongdoing and subsequently punishing that defendant would offend
the moral dignity of the legal proceedings.  Bonnie's term reliability addresses the issue
that the construct of competency must be operationalized within the attorney-client
relationship.  That is, in order to present an adequate defense, the defendant must
have the capacity to appreciate the utility of certain facts and the wherewithal to provide
counsel with that information.  If a defendant is not able to provide counsel with such
information, then the reliability of the criminal process is jeopardized.  Lastly, Bonnie's
rationale of autonomy is based on the legal rules that certain decisions regarding the
defense must be made by the defendant.  One example of such legal decisions is the
defendant's ability to waive counsel.  A defendant’s competency to waive counsel is
incorporated in competency to stand trial abilities. As articulated in Godinez v. Moran
(1993), the defendant's competency to waive counsel does not require a higher level of
mental functioning than his/her ability to waive other constitutional rights.       
Bonnie (1992) addressed the reasons for establishing competency to stand
trial from a more theoretical perspective than Weiner (1985).  However, both Bonnie
and Weiner put forward rationales that address individual and social issues.  Individual
issues, as they pertain to the defendant, include the necessity that the defendant is
treated fairly and that he/she is accurately classified with respect to competency. 
Reasons for establishing competency to stand trial from a broader perspective of the
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criminal justice system involve social issues, such as having a fair and respected
judicial system. These issues were both addressed by Weiner and Bonnie and continue
to be the basis of the need for accurate competency to stand trial evaluations.  
In sum, the legal framework of the Dusky standard was designed to assure a
fair trial and to preserve the finality of legal decisions by resolving all doubts regarding
the defendant’s mental capabilities early in the proceedings (Bonnie, 1992). The Dusky
standard requires a functional analysis of the defendant's current capacities in his/her
current legal context (Grisso, 1986).  Although a comprehensive evaluation of
competency includes an assessment of mental disorders, the diagnosis of a mental
disorder does not imply incompetency.  Likewise, a determination of incompetency
does not require the diagnosis of a mental disorder (Cruise & Rogers, 1998).
Operationally Def ining Dusky
The accurate assessment of any psychological construct is dependent on a
good operational definition of the construct’s components.  In particular, an accurate
classification of competency to stand trial hinges on the clear identification of criteria. 
As a result, several attempts to identify and clarify the specific psycholegal abilities
involved in determining competency have been made since the establishment of the
Dusky standard.   
Bonnie (1992) divided competence into two theoretical constructs which
provide a framework for defining the "psycholegal abilities" required for competency to
stand trial.  They include (a) a foundational competence to assist counsel and (b) a
contextualized concept of decisional competence.  Bonnie defines competence to
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assist counsel as specific criteria that constitute the minimum conditions required for a
defendant to participate in his/her own defense.  These criteria include (a) the capacity
to understand the charges, (b) understanding of the purpose of the legal proceedings
and the adversarial system (especially the role of his/her attorney), (c) appreciation of
one's situation as the defendant, and (d) the ability to recognize and relate pertinent
information regarding the case to his/her attorney.  According to Bonnie, these criteria
serve both the dignity and reliability rationales for establishing competency.  
Bonnie (1992) defined decisional competence as the defendant's ability to
understand and choose among alternative courses of action.  For example, a defendant
must be able to make decisions regarding the plea, the trial (e.g., whether the
defendant will be present, and whether the defendant will testify) and the basic theory
of defense. Bonnie claims that these abilities should be established with respect to the
defendant’s normative level of autonomy in the legal proceedings.  In other words, the
defendant’s decisional competence must be examined within the context of the criminal
proceedings.  Any legal system, such as the system in the United States, that
requiressome level of autonomy on behalf of the defendant will have an inherent need
for decisional competence.  While Bonnie (1992) attempted to clarify pertinent
psycholegal abilities by dividing them into two theoretical domains, some researchers
have attempted to clarify the pertinent psycholegal abilities by presenting them within a
specific legal context. Rogers and Mitchell (1991) illustrated four levels of complexity for
criminal proceedings: (a) competency to plead, (b) competency in a brief trial, (c)
competency in a complicated case, and (d) competency in a complicated trial which
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includes testimony.  For specific psycholegal criteria within each level of complexity, see
Table 1.
Table 1
Progression of Competency Criteria by the Complexity of the Proceedings
________________________________________________________________
Competency to Plead:
   1.  Ability to understand the charges against him/her
   2.  Acknowledgment of guilt and agreement with plea bargaining as an         
alternative
   3.  Capacity to trust his/her lawyer
Competency in a Brief Trial:
   1.  Criteria for fitness to plead
   2.  Ability to maintain courtroom demeanor
   3.  Ability to follow the courtroom proceedings with minimal assistance
Competency in a Complicated Case:
   1.  All the above criteria
   2.  Capacity to actively assess counsel during the trial
   3.  Greater capacity for concentration and ability to follow courtroom         
proceedings
   4.  Ability to maintain appropriate demeanor consistently during several days          of
trial
Competency in a Complicated Trial which Includes Testimony:
   1.  All the above criteria
   2.  Capacity to present his/her own case clearly
   3.  Cognitively intact to the extent of being able to respond clearly to cross-  
        examination
   4.  Ability to work closely with defense counsel in preparation for testimony
_______________________________________________________________
Note. Presented by Rogers and Mitchell (1991, p. 97-98) in Mental health experts and
the criminal courts.
As previously mentioned, the psycholegal criteria needed to establish
competency to stand trial are dependent on the individual and the complexity of the
trial.  In an attempt to better operationalize the pertinent criteria, Skeem and Golding
(1998) identified 31 psycholegal abilities from modern competency to stand trial
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assessment manuals and instruments.  They divided these abilities into 11 global
domains of competency which can be found in Table 2.  
Table 2
Domains and Subdomains of Competency to Stand Trial 
1. Capacity to comprehend and appreciate the charges or allegations
a. Fac tual k now ledge  of the  char ges  (ability to  repo rt cha rge la bel)
b. Understanding of the behaviors to which the charges refer
c. Com prehen sion of the  police vers ion of eve nts
2. Capacity to disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind
a. Ability to provide a reasonable account about one’s behavior around the time of the
alleged offense
b. Ability to provide information about one’s state of mind around the time of the alleged
offense
c. Ability to provide and account of the behavior of relevant others around the time of the
alleged offense
d. Ability to provide an account of police behavior
e. Comprehension of the Miranda warning
f. Confession behavior (influence of mental disorder, suggestibility, and so forth on
confession)
3. Capacity to comprehend appreciate the range and nature of potential penalties
             that may be imposed in the proceedings
a. Knowledge of penalties that could be imposed (e.g., knowledge of the relevant sentence
label associated with the charge, such as “5 to life”)
b. Comprehension of the seriousness of charges and potential sentences
4. Basic knowledge of legal strategies and options
a. Und ersta nding  of the  me aning  of alte rnativ e plea s (e.g ., guilty a nd m enta lly ill)
b. Knowledge of the plea bargaining process
5. Capacity to engage in reasoned  choice of legal strategies and options
a. Capacity to comprehend legal advice
b. Capacity to participate in planning a defense strategy
c. Plausible appraisal of likely outcome (e.g., likely disposition for one’s own case)
d. Comprehension of the implications of a guilty plea or plea bargain (i.e., the rights waived
on en tering  a plea  of gu ilty)
e. Comprehension of the proceeding pro se (e.g., the rights waived and the ramification of
waiver)
f. Capa city to mak e a reas oned c hoice ab out defe nse op tions (e.g., trial stra tegy, guilty
plea, proceeding pro se, pleading insanity) without distortion attributable to mental illness
(an ability to rationally apply knowledge to ones’ own case)
6. Capacity to understand the adversary nature of the proceedings
a. Understanding of the roles of courtroom  personnel (i.e.,  judge, jury, prosecutor)
b. Understanding of courtroom procedure (the basic sequence of trial events)
7. Capacity to manifest appropriate courtroom behavior
a. Appreciation of appropriate courtroom behavior
b. Capacity to manage one’s emotions and behavior in the courtroom
8. Capacity to participate in trial
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a. Capacity to track events as they unfold (not attributable to the effects of medication)
b. Capacity to challenge witnesses (i.e., recognize distortions in witness testimony) 
9. Cap acity to  testify r eleva ntly
     10. Relationship with counsel
a. Rec ogn ition th at counsel is an  ally
b. Appreciation of the attorney-client privilege
c. Confidence in and trust in ones’ counsel
d. Con fiden ce in a ttorneys in g ene ral 
e. Particular relationship variables that may interfere with the specific attorney-client
relationship (i.e., attorney skill in working with the client; problematic socioeconomic or
demogra phic differences between cou nsel and client) 
11. Med icatio n eff ects  on C om pete ncy to  Stan d Tr ial 
a. Capacity to track proceedings given sedation level on current medication
b. Potentially detrimental effects of medication on the defendant’s courtroom demeanor
________________________________________________________________
Note. This table is reproduced from Skeem and Golding (1998).
Assessment of Competency
Traditional methods of assessing competency were typically unstructured
interview-based evaluations that focused on the individual defendant and his/her mental
disorder.  However, competency evaluations increased in standardization as they
focused more on the effects that mental disorders have on a defendant (i.e.,
impairment of legal understanding) and less on the disorder itself.  Prior to this
evolution, the vast majority of psychiatrists evaluating defendants for competency were
unaware of the legal criteria for competency and many clinicians applied the wrong
standard (Hess & Thomas, 1963; Pfeiffer, Eisenstein, & Dabbs, 1967).  In addition,
clinicians often felt that the accused must be free from any symptoms of a mental
disorder in order to be deemed competent to stand trial.  As observed by Robey (1965),
"All too often in his report to the court, the psychiatrist will omit any mention of
competency and refer only to the presence of mental illness and the need for
hospitalization" (p. 617).
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In 1965, Robey created a checklist of legal criteria to be used in competency
to stand trial evaluations.  This checklist was intended to provide mental health
professionals with a convenient review of criteria that should be investigated in
assessing a defendant's competency.  Based on the Dusky standard, Robey's checklist
stipulated that the defendant must show a capacity to (a) listen to the testimony of
witnesses and inform his lawyer of any distortions or misstatements, (b) maintain a
consistent defense (e.g., not insist on a change in strategy without adequate reason),
(c) testify in his or her own defense, and (d) make decisions in response to well-
explained alternatives (e.g., should the defendant waive his or her rights).  
Robey (1965) also examined “capacity to consult” as a key component of
competency to stand trial.  He articulated the following: 
…the patient must be able to divulge to his lawyer without paranoid distrust
the facts of the case as he understands them, even if those "facts" involve
delusional distortion.  He must decide with his lawyer upon a plea and
approve the legal strategy to be used during the trial.  He must also show a
capacity to maintain the relationship with his lawyer.  For example, he cannot
discharge his lawyer solely on the basis of paranoid suspicions or delusions
and still be considered competent (Robey, 1965, p. 619).
Although Robey provided an assessment framework, a more standardized method of
eliciting this information was needed.  The next section reviews the first generation of
competency measures.     
First Generation Competency Measures
Robey's (1965) checklist signified the initial development of forensic
measures.  Forensic measures were designed to assess explicit psycholegal constructs
and to respond to specific referral questions asked by the justice system.  The first
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generation competency measures fell short in their measurement of the three prongs of
the Dusky standard: (a) factual understanding, (b) rational understanding, and (c) ability
to consult with counsel.  Unfortunately, most of the first-generation competency
measures failed to establish good construct validity in relation to these prongs.   
First-generation measures tended to be interview-based instruments that
were developed in order to gather pertinent information regarding competency to stand
trial in a standardized manner.  However, early measures were typically self-report
instruments that sacrificed eliciting case-specific information in lieu of standardization. 
As the development of competency to stand trial measures evolved, instruments
improved in their ability to elicit case-specific information relevant to Dusky.  Early
research on first-generation measures is important to understand the subsequent
developments of modern competency measures.   
In this section, all first generation competency measures designed to assess
the psycholegal abilities outlined in Dusky will be presented.  Each measure will be
discussed with respect to its development, administration, and scoring criteria. 
Furthermore psychometric data for each measure is provided.    
Competency Screening Test (CST)
Development and Administration  
The Competency Screening Test (CST; Lipsitt, Lelos, & McGarry, 1971) is a
22-item sentence completion instrument that focuses on courtroom situations relevant
to the legal criteria of competency.  Each item is scored on a three-point scale (0-2) with
high agreement among trained scorers (interjudge reliability = .93).  The CST was
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developed in 1971, during a time when defendants who were deemed incompetent
were often hospitalized indefinitely.  Early research (Lipsitt et al., 1971) suggested that
the use of the CST reduced the likelihood of a competent person being hospitalized
indefinitely since the majority of defendants with high scores were returned for trial.  
Psychometric Properties
Nicholson, Briggs, and Robertson (1988) performed an internal consistency
analyses and factor analyses on the CST with 140 inpatient defendants admitted to the
Forensic Unit of a state hospital.  The CST showed high internal reliability (alpha
coefficient of .85) and an inter-item correlation of .20.  However, relatively few of the
items correlated with psychopathology.  Furthermore, the three factors from the
principal axis factoring (PAF) with a varimax rotation were difficult to interpret and did
not appear congruent with Dusky.  A later study by Bagby, Nicholson, Rogers, and
Nussbaum (1992) also failed to produce clear and independent factors for the CST.
Criterion-Related Validity  
As a screen for competency evaluations, the CST has been studied
extensively with results consistently establishing its criterion-related validity.  Using a
sample of 50 male residents at a state forensic unit, Nottingham and Mattson (1981)
found that the CST correctly predicted the competency recommendations of a forensic
team in 82% of the cases.  Nicholson, Robertson, Johnson, and Jensen (1988) found
that 71.2% of their classifications based on the CST cut scores were consistent with
independent clinical decisions of competency.  Furthermore, determinations of
competency based on the CST were highly correlated with corresponding
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determinations based on the GCCT (Nicholson et al., 1988). 
Abbreviated Versions of the CST
Several short forms of the CST have been offered as efficient screens of
competency (Nicholson, 1988; Parmesh, 1987; Shatin, 1979).  These studies suggest a
general equivalence between the CST and abbreviated versions.  As a result of their
brevity, these versions are marginally more time efficient.
 Summary of Measure 
Although research has repeatedly established the criterion-related validity of
the CST, studies have failed to establish its construct validity.  The CST does not
appear to have either a clear factor structure or correspondence to the Dusky standard. 
In addition, the CST employs the use of an arbitrary cut score established by Lipsitt et
al. (1971) that is based on qualitative differences between defendants scoring above
and below 20.  The use of an arbitrary cut score lacks empirical validation and
complicates the interpretation of scores that are near the cut score.   Nevertheless, the
CST could facilitate a decision of competency when the defendant scores extremely
high or low.  In summary, research suggests that the CST should not solely be used by
clinicians to make decision regarding a defendant's competency to stand trial.  
The CST appears to offer some utility as a screen for competency to stand
trial.  Furthermore, research supports the utility of the abbreviated versions of the CST
which can be administered quickly and often predicts competency as accurately as the
original CST.  Given its paper-and-pencil format, Lipsitt et al. (1971) suggested that it
could be administered in courtroom setting by probation officers or social workers. 
Toward this objective, the CST was designed as a screening measure and “where an
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issue of competency remains, a referral could be made to a state hospital for intensive
evaluation” to determine competency (Lipsitt et al., p. 108).  In keeping with its original
objective, determinations of competency should not be made solely on the results of the
CST.  
Competency Assessment Instrument (CAI)
Development and Administration
The Competency Assessment Instrument (CAI; McGarry, 1973) was
developed to address the need for a brief evaluation for competency to stand trial. 
Historically, competency assessments were often conducted as lengthy inpatient
evaluations (Roesch, 1978).  In an attempt to alter the system, brief community-based
evaluations were implemented via the CAI.  The CAI was designed to measure a
defendant's awareness and understanding of competency issues with a focus more on
legal than clinical criteria.  The CAI is a semi-structured interview that assesses 13
functions of competency to stand trial such as (a) an appraisal of available legal
defenses, (b) the planning of legal strategy, and (c) the capacity to testify relevantly. 
Each item is scored on a five-point likert scale.  The CAI manual suggests that a
defendant who scores consistently low (<3) should be remanded to an inpatient unit for
further evaluation. 
Reliability 
With respect to reliability, Roesch (1978) found that inter-rater agreement on
individual items ranged from 68.8% to 96.7%, with a median of 81.2%.  Grisso (1986)
also examined the inter-rater reliability of the CAI and found very high correlations for
experienced (r  = .92) and inexperienced (r = .87) raters.
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Criterion-Related Validity
Roesch (1978) studied the utility of the CAI as a brief evaluation prior to a
lengthier assessment for the determination of competency.  The CAI was compared to
competency judgements made by hospital staff and had an overall rate of agreement of
90%.  Other studies have found only moderate agreement when compared to
evaluations by hospital staff (Schreiber, 1982) and other competency measures (i.e.,
the CST and IFI; Schreiber, Roesch, & Golding, 1987).
Summary of Measure
The CAI was designed to assess competency in a community-based
evaluation as opposed to the traditional institutionally bases evaluations.  However,
research suggests that the CAI would not serve as a good assessment measure.  With
respect to criterion-related validity, some studies produced only moderate results. 
Schreiber et al., (1987) found that as many as 10% of the defendants found unfit by the
hospital or court would be considered fit if decisions were based solely on the CAI.  The
CAI’s primary contribution to competency to stand trial measures is methodological.  Its
development signaled the initial use of more structured interviews for competency
evaluations that focused primarily on the legal issues as opposed to the defendants'
mental disorders.   
Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview (IFI)
Development and Administration 
The Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview (IFI; Golding, Roesch, & Schreiber,
1984) is administered by a clinician-lawyer team.  This design in administration was
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intended to link the different perspectives of psychology and law.  However, by design,
its administration is less practical than other competency measures.  Specifically, the
necessity of employing both a lawyer knowledgeable in mental health and a forensic
psychologist for assessment makes its administration difficult.
The IFI consists of three major sections that are rated separately by each
examiner: (a) Section A: Legal Issues, (b) Section B: Psychopathological Issues, and
(c) Section C: Overall Evaluation of Competency.  Each section requires a different
decision making process on behalf of the rater.  For Legal Issues, five psycholegal
abilities are considered on a three-point likert scale with respect to incapacity of the
defendant and the effects of those abilities on the overall decision of competence.  For
Psychopathological Issues, the rater is required to rate ten symptoms on how they
affect competency.  Finally, on Overall Evaluation of Competency, examiners are asked
to make a global judgement of competency, assign a confidence rating to that
judgement, and comment on factors that contributed to that decision.  The rationale
behind the three sections of the IFI is the need for a defendant's competency to be
considered within the context of his/her legal proceedings.  In particular, different cases
should vary in how much weight is assigned to the IFI’s three sections depending on
case-specific issues.  
Reliability  
Golding et al. (1984) provided preliminary reliability and validity data on the
IFI using 77 pretrial defendants referred for competency evaluations.  With respect to
inter-rater reliability, they found excellent agreement (mean kappa coefficient = .93) on
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overall competency (Section C).  Agreement between attorneys and mental health
professionals was better on Psychopathological Issues (Section B; mean kappa
coefficient = .67) than Legal Issues (Section A; mean kappa coefficient = .48). 
Criterion-Related Validity
Schreiber et al. (1987) found decisions of competency based on the IFI
significantly agreed with corresponding judgements on the CAI.  Furthermore, they
found that interviewers who utilized the IFI had the highest agreement (90.6%) with a
review panel consisting of a consensus of two nationally respected experts who
reviewed the cases.  However, it should be noted that although the panelists reviewed
the police and hospital records, they also had access to the "project interviews".  In
other words, criterion contamination occurred because the panelists were exposed to
the IFI results in rendering their decisions of competency.  This confound undermines
the criterion-related validity established by the study.  
Summary of Measure  
The IFI promised well-substantiated recommendations of competency based
on its multi-disciplinary approach.  However, the impractical nature of its administration
questions its utility as an efficient measure of competency to stand trial.  Furthermore,
research findings support the reliability of the measure, but data on its criterion-related
validity appear contaminated. 
Georgia Court Competency Test (GCCT)
Development and Administration
The GCCT (Wildman et al., 1980) was originally developed as a rapid and
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quantitative screening device.  It is a semi-structured interview that can be administered
and scored by paraprofessionals.  The original GCCT was composed of 17 items that
addressed courtroom and legal proceedings, current charges and possible penalties,
and the attorney-client relationship (Wildman et al., 1979).  The GCCT has undergone
several revisions.  In 1987, the GCCT was expanded to include  21 items in a semi-
structured interview format with scoring criteria for each item and a cut score for
competency recommendations (Georgia Court Competency Test - Mississippi State
Hospital [GCCT- MSH]; Johnson & Mullet, 1987).  In 1992, an eight-item screen for
feigning was added to the GCCT-MSH (Georgia Court Competency Test - 1992
Revision [GCCT]; Gothard, Rogers, & Sewell, 1995).     
Reliability  
Research on the GCCT-MSH demonstrated excellent inter-rater reliability
(Nicholson et al., 1988) and good internal consistency across multiple studies.  With
respect to internal consistency, Nicholson et al. (1988) reported a high Cronbach's
alpha of .88 with a mean inter-item correlation of .36.  Similarly, Ustad, Rogers, Sewell,
and Guarnaccia (1996) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .89 with a mean inter-item
correlation of .28.
Validity  
With respect to criterion-related validity, the GCCT-MSH has consistently
classified defendants as competent or incompetent.  Demonstrating its utility as a
screen, Nicholson et al. (1988) reported an overall hit rate of 85.4% with a false positive
rate of 53.6%.  As mentioned above, the GCCT-MSH showed a high rate of agreement
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with decisions of competency based on the CST.  
The construct validity of the GCCT has been extensively researched with
respect to its underlying factor structure.  However, these studies of the GCCT-MSH
have produced conflicting findings.  The original factor analysis produced two factors:
“knowledge of the court” and “style of responding to legal situation” (Grisso, 1986, p.
103).  In 1988, Nicholson et al. established a three- factor solution: (a) general legal
knowledge, (b) courtroom layout, and (c) specific legal knowledge.  They found the
factor most predictive of staff decisions of competency was "specific legal knowledge"
which  included items relevant to the defendant's case.  It also appeared to assess
psychopathology and intellectual ability.  In 1992, Bagby et al. used congruence
analyses to test the three-factor solution and found good congruence for two of the
three factors.  These two factors corresponded to the “courtroom layout” factor and
“specific legal knowledge” factor found by Nicholson et al. (1988).  
Recent studies (Rogers, Ustad, Sewell, & Reinhart, 1996; Ustad et al. 1996)
have failed to confirm the three-factor solution previously established by Nicholson et al.
(1988).  However, a two-factor solution with unique loadings on “legal knowledge” was
established via exploratory factor analysis (PAF with varimax rotation; Ustad et al.,
1996).  The two-factor solution by Ustad et al. (1996) accounted for 36.0% of the
variance and was similar to the two-factor solution established by Bagby et al. (1992)
with “legal knowledge” and “courtroom layout” as factors.  In summary, factor analytic
studies fail to establish a stable factor structure for the GCCT.  However, several factor
structures have been suggested and research has demonstrated the presence of one
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distinct factor assessing “legal knowledge”.
Summary of Measure
The GCCT has been studied extensively, but problems continue with its
validation.  With respect to construct validity, research provides some evidence of
independent factors on the GCCT; however, these factors do not appear to be stable
nor representative of the underlying constructs of the Dusky standard.  The criterion-
related validity of the GCCT has been established with high rates of agreement
between the GCCT and staff decisions of competency.  However, the high base rate of
competent defendants in several of these studies calls to question its criterion-related
validity.  Despite one study with a lower base rate of competent defendants (Wildman,
White, & Brandenburg, 1990), the criterion-related validity of the GCCT remains
questionable.    
Second Generation Competency Measures
The relevance of first-generation competency measures to the Dusky
standard is questionable.  Two reasons for the questionable relevance are (a) the lack
of research supporting their construct validity, and (b) the lack of opportunity to educate
misinformed defendants. Regarding the latter, defendant’s competency is not solely
determined by his or her current knowledge of the legal process.  For example, when
assessing for factual understanding, the defendant would not automatically be deemed
incompetent for not knowing the role of the prosecutor.  The question of competency
lies in the defendant’s ability to learn factual information about court proceedings.  In
addressing this issue, second-generation measures, such as the MacArthur
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Competence Assessment Tool - Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA; Poythress et al.,
1999) and the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial - Revised (ECST-R; Rogers &
Tillbrook, 1998), were designed to determine competency based not only on the
defendant's current knowledge, but also on his/her ability to assimilate new information. 
 This review focuses on two recently developed competency measures, the
MacCAT-CA and ECST-R, that not only assess for the defendant’s current knowledge
of the legal system, but attempts to educate the individual when he or she does not
readily reply with the correct response.  The MacCAT-CA is a semi-structured interview
that was developed from a longer research interview, the MacArthur Structured
Assessment of the Competencies of Criminal Defendants (MacSAC-CD; Hoge et al.,
1997).  The ECST (Rogers, 1995) was developed in order to better address the
psycholegal abilities put forth in Dusky v. United States and to provide clinicians with a
standardized method of assessing feigned incompetence.  These measures are
reviewed individually in subsequent sections.    
The MacArthur Competence Assessment Test - Criminal Adjudication (Mac-CAT-CA)
Development and Administration
As mentioned previously, the MacCAT-CA was developed from the MacSAC-
CD (Hoge et al., 1997) which was developed with the intent of providing a superior
research tool utilized to investigate specific abilities related to competency.  On the
MacSAC-CD and the subsequent MacCAT-CA, the defendant is presented with a
vignette and subsequently responds to questions addressing competency issues.  The
defendant must select which of two facts in the vignette is more important to tell a
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lawyer and make hypothetical decisions by weighing the risks and benefits associated
with these facts.  The defendant must also reflect on his own case  and assess the
probability of certain legal outcomes and the best way to plead.  
MacCAT-CA uses standardized questions in a semi-structured interview
format with criterion-based scoring to measure competence-related abilities (i.e.,
understanding, reasoning, and appreciation).  In addition, the MacCAT-CA evaluates a
defendant's ability to understand and assimilate new legal information through exposure
to correct information and immediate retesting.  In other words, if the defendant
incorrectly responds to questions about the legal process he or she is presented with
the correct information and given a second chance to answer the item correctly. 
Poythress et al. (1998) asserted that this is an advantage over most contemporary
competency measures which focus mostly on present, or factual knowledge, and not a
defendant's ability to learn and make appropriate decisions.
The length of administration and diff icult scoring system of the MacSAC-CD
led to the development the more condensed, clinical version, the MacCAT-CA.  In
contrast to the MacSAC-CD’s length (i.e., 47 items and nearly 2 hours to administer),
the MacCAT-CA consists of 22 simpler items that can be administered in 20 to 30
minutes.  In addition, the administration and scoring procedures were simplified for the
MacCAT-CA.  All items on the MacCAT-CA are administered verbally with possible
scores on each item ranging from 0 (no credit) to 2 (full credit).      
Construct Validity  
The MacSAC-CD and the subsequent MacCAT-CA operationalize Bonnie's
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(1992) two dimensional theory of competency: competence to assist counsel and
decisional competence.  The MacCAT-CA includes items that tap both of these
conceptual domains and combines items to assess three psycholegal abilities: (a)
understanding, (b) reasoning, and (c) appreciation.  Although the design focuses on a
contemporary legal theory, its relevance to Dusky is questionable as the majority of
MacCAT-CA items pertain to a hypothetical vignette.  In contrast, Dusky requires the
assessment of case-specific abilities.  Thus, it is unclear if the three psycholegal
abilities of the MacCAT-CA tap the underlying constructs of the Dusky standard.   
Reliability  
Otto et al. (1998) examined the internal consistency of the three competency-
related abilities and found satisfactory alpha coefficients: .85 (understanding), .81
(reasoning), and .88 (appreciation).  However, these scale reliability indicators are
dependent on inter-item correlations which were substantial (i.e., .42, .36, and .54
respectively).  Inter-scorer reliability coefficients ranged from moderate to excellent
(appreciation = .75, reasoning = .85, understanding = .90).  However, this estimate of
reliability is confounded by hierarchical questions that cue the second rater and
subsequently inflate reliability estimates (Rogers, 2001).    
Criterion-Related Validity 
The MacCAT-CA demonstrated an ability to distinguish between defendants
hospitalized for incompetency and presumably competent defendants receiving mental
health services in jail.  Poythress et al. (1998) found the hospitalized incompetent group
scored lower on Understanding and Appreciation subscales than nonhospitalized
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competent defendants.  No differences were found on the Reasoning subscale, which
corresponds to the ability to consult with counsel prong of the Dusky standard
(Poythress et al., 1999).  Perhaps its inability to distinguish between competent and
incompetent individuals stems from the hypothetical nature of the attorney-client
relationship.  
 The Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial (ECST)
Development and Administration  
The Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial (ECST) was developed by
Rogers in 1995 and later revised (ECST-R; Rogers & Tillbrook, 1998).  The ECST-R
goes beyond the MacCAT-CA in that it emphasizes the defendant's relationship with his
or her attorney and includes a screen for feigning.  The ECST-R is a semi-structured
interview with items that are rated on levels of impairment due to  psychotic symptoms
and self defeating motivation.  The ECST-R includes a few brief questions establishing
the basis of the attorney-client relationship, followed by four sections: (a) Nature of the
Attorney-Client Relationship, (b) Factual Understanding of Courtroom Proceedings, (c)
Rational Understanding of Courtroom Proceedings, and (d) Atypical Presentation.
Reliability  
With respect to inter-rater reliability, Tillbrook (1998) analyzed the ratings of
three raters and produced moderate results (phi coeff icients ranged from .69 to .83).
Furthermore, Tillbrook (2000) established a moderately high level of internal
consistency (alpha = .75) for the ECST-R. 
Criterion-Related Validity
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Tillbrook (1997) established the criterion-related validity of the ECST through
correlations between three individual clinicians and (a) forensic examiners and (b)
circuit court judges.  When compared to forensic examiners, the correlations between
different raters varied.  Moderate correlations were found consistently with circuit court
judges.
Construct Validity
The development of the ECST emphasized clinically relevant constructs
associated with the three major components of the Dusky standard.  This objective was
accomplished through a prototypical analysis on a preliminary set of psycholegal criteria
and subcriteria.  First, the Dusky standard was operationalized through the use of
psycholegal constructs relevant to most criminal cases and able to be assessed within
the confines of forensic evaluations.  Then, a panel of forensic and legal experts
rendered prototypical ratings of the psycholegal criteria and subcriteria established. 
Results indicated that items on the ECST ranged from moderately representative to
very representative of the Dusky standard.  Although the importance and centrality of
factual understanding was more variable than either rational understanding or ability to
consult with counsel, the criteria were generally judged to be very representative of
Dusky.    
Feigning Incompetence to Stand Trial
Defendants may be tempted to feign incompetency, either to delay the
proceedings or to possibly mitigate the eventual sentence, due to the gravity of their
legal situation.  Therefore, it is essential that competency measures systematically
29
assess for feigned incompetency.  Unfortunately, competency measures have
neglected to evaluate feigned incompetency.  Only one first-generation measure (the
GCCT) and one second-generation measure (the ECST-R) address this crucial issue.  
The GCCT includes eight items designed to screen for atypical presentation. 
Included in these items are absurd questions such as, “Are the judge’s black robes
associated with black magic?” and rarely endorsed symptoms such as, “Do you often
wonder what the court reporter is really thinking?”  Gothard et al. (1995) investigated
the revised GCCT’s ability to screen for feigning.  Results indicated that competent
offenders were able to simulate incompetency and scored low on the GCCT.  They
concluded that the GCCT Atypical Presentation Scale (G-APS) showed promise in the
screening of defendants for feigned incompetency. 
One primary reason for the development of the ECST was to provide
clinicians with a standardized method to screen for feigned incompetency.  The ECST-
R Atypical Presentation Scale (E-APS) includes 28 items that measure unusual
presentation through several detection strategies.  These detection strategies include:
(a) rare symptoms, (b) symptom combinations, (c) indiscriminant symptom
endorsement, and (d) symptom severity.  Each of these strategies is described in detail
below.    
The E-APS employs two related strategies: rare symptoms and symptom
combinations.  The rare symptom strategy "involves the overendorsement of symptoms
and associated features that occur only occasionally in patients with mental disorders"
(Rogers, 1997, p. 303). According to Rogers, rare symptoms is one of the most robust
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strategies for the detection of feigning.  An example of a rare-symptom item from the E-
APS is: "Do people in the courtroom use telepathic powers to make you say things
against your will?"  A second and related strategy used to detect feigning is symptom
combinations.  This detection strategy involves the endorsement of symptom pairs that
typically do not occur together in genuine patients.  An example of a symptom-
combinations item from the E-APS is the following: “Do you feel so upset about court,
that your memory plays tricks on you?”.     
Unlike the rare symptoms and symptom combination strategies that involve
only atypical items, two other strategies involve an analysis of all responses.  One such
strategy is indiscriminant symptom endorsement (Rogers,1997).  This strategy
assesses the overall proportion of symptoms endorsed by the defendant.  If an
unrealistically high proportion of symptoms are endorsed on the E -APS, feigning
should be suspected.  A second strategy based on the entire scale is the severity of
symptoms (Rogers, 1997).  On every item in which the defendant endorses a symptom,
he or she is asked about its severity in relationship to competency.  Namely, they are
asked if that symptom makes it difficult for them to participate in the legal process.  A
high number of symptoms that allegedly impair competency could suggest feigning.  All
of these interview-based strategies for detecting feigning have been validated in
research with both simulation designs and known groups comparisons (Rogers, 1997).  
Current Study
Purpose of the Study
Competency to stand trial evaluations constitute the largest number of
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criminal referrals for forensic psychologists, with estimates reaching approximately
50,000 per year (Skeem et al., 1998).  Although research generally supports the use of
specific forensic measures in facilitating decisions regarding competency to stand trial,
the relevance of those measures to the Dusky standard is questionable.  With respect
to the validity, research has traditionally focused primarily on criterion-related validity of
single competency measures.  The construct validity of second generation measures
has not been systematically studied.  Furthermore, studies of convergent validity across
different first generation competency measures do not address the applicability to
Dusky.  Using a standardized approach, this study examined the construct validity of
three competency measures.  Its purpose was to demonstrate how well those
measures address the psycholegal constructs of Dusky.
Because the assessment of malingering and deception is a necessary
component of comprehensive competency evaluations, the second purpose of this
study involved determining which competency measures best address issues of feigned
incompetence.  Using the SIRS as the gold standard, two competency measures are
examined for their ability to screen for feigning.  Utility estimates included positive
predictive power (PPP), negative predictive power, sensitivity (NPP), specificity, and hit
rates.  
Research Questions
Research Question #1  
Is there evidence of convergent and discriminant validity across competency
measures for the three prongs of the Dusky standard? 
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Research Question #2 
 Which of the competency measures has the best construct validity for
determining competency to stand trial?        
Research Question #3  
What are the relative contributions ofpsychotic and mood symptoms to the
prediction of defendants' competency to stand trial? 
Research Question #4  
How effective are the ECST Atypical Presentation Scale and the GCCT





The construct validity of the three competency measures was evaluated by
using a multitrait-multimethod design.  Table 3 provides a conceptualization of the
multitrait-multimethod matrix which was utilized in order to investigate the research
questions addressing the validity of competency measures. Construct validity of the
Dusky Standard was examined through comparisons of convergent and discriminant
validity coefficients based on the criteria established by Campbell and Fiske (1959). 
Convergent validity is the correlations across similar measures (i.e., monotrait-
heteromethod) for each Dusky prong.  Discriminant validity consists of the correlations
between different constructs both (a) within a measure (i.e., heterotrait-monomethod)
and (b) between measures (i.e., heterotrait-heteromethod; see Table 3).  For the
purpose of the analyses, items on each measure were categorized by the three Dusky
prongs as illustrated in Table 4.      
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Table 3
Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix for the Dusky Prongs of Competency to Stand Trial
___________________________________________________________________________________________
GCCT            MacCAT-CA                  ECST                    
   
 Factual   Rational   Assist       Factual   Rational   Assist Factual   Rational   Assist
___________________________________________________________________________________________
GCCT
       Factual "
       Rational  D1      "
       Assist D1      D1          "
MacCAT-CA
       Factual C      D2          D2 "
       Rational D2      C          D2 D1     "
       Assist D2      D2          C D1     D1        "
ECST
       Factual C      D2          D2 C     D2          D2     "
       Rational D2      C          D2 D2     C        D2     D1          "
       Assist D2      D2          C D2     D2        C     D1                  D1            "
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Note.  Factual = factual understanding; Rational = rational understanding; Assist = ability to consult with counsel 
" = Alpha Coefficients (monotrait-monomethod); C = Convergent Validity (monotrait-heteromethod); 
D1 = Discriminant Validity (heterotrait-monomethod); D2 = Discriminant Validity (heterotrait-heteromethod); 
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Table 4
Correspondence Between the Dusky Prongs and Scales on Competency Measures  
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Measure Scales or Sections of Measure Dusky Prongs
___________________________________________________________________________________________
GCCT-MSH Picture of court and functions Factual Understanding
Charge Rational Understanding
Nature of attorney-client relationship Ability to Assist Counsel
MacCAT-CA Understanding Factual Understanding
Appreciation Rational Understanding
Reasoning Ability to Assist Counsel
ECST Factual understanding of courtroom proceedings Factual Understanding
Rational understanding of courtroom proceedings Rational Understanding
Basis and nature of attorney-client relationship Ability to Assist Counsel
___________________________________________________________________________________________
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As previously stated, analysis of the Dusky standard via the multitrait-
multimethod compares the relative strength of the convergent and discriminant validity. 
In particular, the convergent correlation should be higher than both the heterotrait-
heteromethod and the heterotrait-monomethod correlations.  A comparison violation
occurs when the discriminant validity coefficients are higher than the convergent validity
coefficients.  The following criteria established by Bagozzi and Yi (1991) for determining
the level of discriminant validity via comparison violations were utilized: “high” has less
than 5% comparison violations; “moderate” has 6 to 33% comparison violations; and
“low” has more than 33% comparison violations.  
Participants
One-hundred mentally disordered offenders were recruited from the mental
health pods at the Tarrant County Jail in Fort Worth, Texas. Only male defendants were
included in the study because the Tarrant County Jail does not have a mental health
unit for female offenders.  All inmates in the mental health pod were in treatment
consisting primarily of psychotropic medications.  These medications included (a)
antidepressants and mood stabilizers, (b) anxiolytics, and (c) antipsychotic medications. 
Informed Consent 
Inmates that agreed to take part in the study were informed that their
participation was entirely voluntary and that there was no penalty for not participating. 
Furthermore, inmates were informed that the interviews would have no effect on their
treatment or their legal case.  They were asked to give written informed consent
affirming that they understand the above conditions.  The study and its consent forms
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were approved by the University of North Texas Institutional Review Board.    
Measures
Georgia Court Competency Test - Mississippi State Hospital (GCCT)
The GCCT has 29 items divided into three sections.  The first section (14
items) rates the defendant's knowledge of courtroom layout and the roles of the
participants in a trial.  The second section (7 items) is divided into three parts: (a) ability
to assist attorney, (b) knowledge of charges and possible penalties, and (c) recollection
of events.  Finally, the third section (8 items) is an Atypical Presentation Scale
administered to assess for feigning.  The GCCT is administered as semi-structured
interview and can be completed in 15 to 20 minutes.
The GCCT-MSH (Johnson & Mullett, 1987) has been extensively tested in
numerous jurisdictions and widely used in the evaluation of competency.  The GCCT-
MSH has demonstrated both criterion-related validity (e.g., high correlations with staff
decisions of competency) and discriminant validity (e.g., no significant correlation with
staff decisions of criminal responsibility).  Using the recommended cut score of 70,
Nicholson et al., (1988) found that the GCCT-MSH accurately classified 94.3% of
defendants and demonstrated excellent inter-rater reliability (r = .95).  In addition, as
mentioned in the introduction, both the GCCT-MSH and the revised GCCT have
demonstrated good internal reliability and scale homogeneity (Nicholson et al., 1988;
Ustad et al., 1996). 
MacArthur Competency Assessment Test (Mac-CAT-CA)  
The MacCAT-CA is administered as a semi-structured interview consisting of
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22 items that can be administered in 20 to 30 minutes.  Since each item is scored
between 0 (no credit) and 2 (full credit), the range of total scores for the component
measures is 0-16 for understanding, 0-16 for reasoning, and 0-12 for appreciation.  
The Mac-CAT-CA (Hoge et al., 1997) represents the most recent
development in competency measures.  The psychometric properties of the MacCAT-
CA's psycholegal abilities of understanding, reasoning, and appreciation were
examined in a national normative study funded by the National Institute of Mental
Health (Otto et al., 1998).  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the psycholegal
abilities of the MacCAT-CA demonstrated relatively high alpha coefficients (.81-.88), but
yielded substantial mean inter-item correlations (.36 - .54).  The MacCAT-CA's inter-
rater reliabilities ranged from good to excellent (.75 - .90). 
Otto et al. (1998) also examined the construct validity of the MacCAT-CA in
relation to competency status, correlations with clinical judgments of competence, and
correlations with psychopathology. In addition to its ability to discriminate between
competent and incompetent defendants, the MacCAT-CA demonstrated concurrent and
convergent validity.  
Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial (ECST)
The ECST (Rogers, 1995)  consists of two components.  Part 1 of the
measure consists of 30 items that assesses the following aspects of competency to
stand trial: (a) the basis of the attorney-client relationship, (b) the nature of the attorney-
client relationship, (c) factual understanding of the courtroom proceedings, and (d) a
rational understanding of the courtroom proceedings.  The second part of the ECST
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consists of 28 items that screen defendants for feigned incompetency.  Both sections of
the ECST can be administered in 30 minutes.  
Two studies have established moderately high levels of inter-rater reliability
for the ECST with agreement between raters of 89.3% (Tillbrook, 1997) and 85.5%
(Tillbrook, 2000).  Tillbrook (1998) produced highly reliable results with the ECST that
were convergent with legal outcomes in a study of 26 male pretrial defendants.  The
validity of the ECST was established through correlations between three individual
raters and (a) forensic examiners and (b) circuit court judges.  When compared to
forensic examiners, the correlations of the different raters varied (phi coefficients of .75,
.48, and .78).  Moderate correlations were found when the individual rater’s decisions
were compared to that of circuit court judges (phi coefficients of .66, .79, and .66).    
Schedule of Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia - Change Version  
The SADS-C (Spitzer & Endicott, 1978b) is a brief diagnostic interview that
can be administered in 15-20 minutes and is intended to measure important dimensions
of psychopathology.  Abbreviated from the SADS (Spitzer & Endicott, 1978a), it
includes 45 items assessing key psychiatric symptoms.  The SADS-C has been shown
to have a high degree of reliability for symptoms (median ICC = .88) and for summary
scales (median ICC = .93; McDonald-Scott & Endicott, 1984).  Furthermore, Johnson,
Margo, and Stern (1986) found the symptom subscales of the SADS-C to have
convergent and discriminant validity with other diagnostic instruments.  Moreover, the
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SADS-C was able to accurately discriminate between broad diagnostic groups.
Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS)  
The SIRS (Rogers, 1992) is a structured interview consisting of 172 items
that focuses on response styles and will be used to classify participants as feigning or
not feigning. The SIRS, which can be administered in 20 to 30 minutes, has excellent
reliability and discriminant validity (Rogers, 1995; Rogers, 2001).  Furthermore, it has
high inter-rater reliability (median r = .95), even when used by nonprofessionals
(Linblad, 1993).  Gothard et al. (1995) tested the effectiveness of the SIRS in detecting
malingering of competency to stand trial.  They found that simulators and suspected
malingerers scored significantly higher on all of the SIRS primary scales.  Furthermore,




All offenders on the mental health pods were invited to participate in this
study; however, not all inmates on the pod volunteered.  Participation was completely
voluntary and no incentives were offered to volunteers. Initially, the correctional officer
on duty made a verbal announcement to the unit regarding the study and asked for
volunteers.  Subsequently, the researcher approached individual inmates on the pod
and asked them if they would like to volunteer for the study.  Two participants did not
complete the study.  One participant that was not asked to participate in the study
because he was unable to speak English fluently. A second participant was unable to
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complete the testing because he was severely sedated by his medication. 
Order of Administration of Measures
A brief introduction was used to build rapport with each participant.  Then, the
five measures were administered to each participant in a standardized order.   The
SADS-C was administered first as an independent measure of the defendant’s current
psychopathology.  The SADS-C was administered first so that results of other
measures would not bias the clinician while rating the participant’s level of
psychopathology.  Following the SADS-C, the three competency measures were
administered in a counterbalanced order.  Counterbalancing these measures reduced
the possibility of ordering effects on three closely related competency measures (i.e.,
the GCCT, MacCAT-CA, and ECST).  The SIRS was administered last to each
participant because of its structured format.  The rationale for administering the SIRS
last is that its structure minimizes the chance that previous measures altered the scores
on the SIRS.
Duration of Administration 
Interviews took place in a private room on the mental health pod with a
closed door.  Only the clinician and the defendant were present during the
administration of all measures in order to ensure the participants' confidentiality. 
However, because the room was separated from the pod by windows, the participant
and the researcher were in view of those on the pod floor.  For some participants, the
view of the pod floor seemed to be somewhat of a distraction resulting in slightly longer
administration times.  Typically, the measures took three hours to administer; however,
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some participants were interviewed in less than two hours.  Furthermore, a few
administration sessions lasted as long as five hours due to excessive verbalization,
severe pathology, and necessary breaks.  Inmates were allowed to take breaks during
the administration of measures and several breaks were required to accommodate the
procedures of the correctional system.  Breaks from the test administration were
needed for (a) smoking (b) bathroom needs (c) eating, and (d) medication, and (e) lock-
down. 
Inter-rater Reliability 
An independent rater observed 14 complete administrations of the measures
in order to obtain estimates of inter-rater reliabilities for each competency measure. 
Inter-rater reliability estimates were determined for each prong of the Dusky standard
as well as for the total score on the competency measures.  
Classification of Criterion Groups
All participants included in the competency analyses were screened for
feigning with the SIRS.  The SIRS has eight primary scales on which the participant can
score in the honest range, indeterminate range, probable feigning range, or definite
feigning range.  According to the test manual, a person should be classified as feigning
if he or she scores in the probable or definite feigning range on three or more of the
primary scales (Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992).  Employing these criteria, 21
participants were classified as feigners and not included in the majority of analyses. 
The remaining participants were classified as incompetent or competent
based on their scores on the MacCAT-CA and the GCCT.  Participants were classified
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as incompetent on the MacCAT-CA if they scored in the "clinically significant
impairment" range on any of the three scales (i.e., understanding, appreciation, or
reasoning).  Participants were classified as incompetent on the GCCT if their total score
was less than 70 out of a possible 100.  For subsequent analyses, participants were
classified as incompetent if they were classified as incompetent on the MacCAT-CA or
the GCCT.  Likewise, participants were classified as competent only if they scored in





All participants (i.e., the total sample) were screened on the Structured
Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS) and participants that were classified as
feigning were excluded from the majority of the analysis involved in this study. The
excluded group are referred to as the “feigned sample.”  The remaining participants are
referred to as the “disordered sample”.  Analyses for Research Questions 1-3 included
only the disordered sample while Research Question 4 used both the disordered and
feigned samples.  The descriptive statistics for each sample are provided below. 
Total Sample 
The participants had a mean age of 34.75 years (SD = 8.81) ranging from 17
to 59 years of age.  The average years of education for the total sample was 11.01
years (SD = 2.54) with one participant having only a third grade education and 4
participants having a college degree.  The racial composition of the sample was 67
(67.0%) Anglo-Americans, 23 (23.0%) African Americans, 6 (6.0%) Hispanic
Americans; 4 (4.0%) individuals identified themselves as biracial.
Disordered Sample
The disordered sample consisted of 79 participants  with a mean age of
35.61 (SD = 8.63) and mean education level of 11.12 (SD = 8.63).  Of the 79 individuals
included in these analyses, 56 (70.9%) were Caucasian, 16 (20.3%) were African-
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American, 6 (7.6%) were Hispanic-American, and one person (1.3%) classified himself
as biracial.
Feigned Sample
The feigned sample consisted of 21 participants. The participants ranged in
age from 17 to 53 with a mean age of 31.52 years (SD = 8.95). The level of education
for the feigned sample ranged from 5th grade to college, with an average of 10.58 (SD =
2.17) years of education. The racial composition of the feigned sample was 11 (52.4%)
Anglo-Americans, 7 (33.3%) African Americans, and 3 (14.3%) individuals who
identified themselves as biracial.
Descriptive Statistics for Feigned and Disordered Samples
Statistical analysis revealed no significant differences between honest
responders and feigners on demographic variables such as age, race, and education
(see Table 5).  Furthermore, chi square analysis was used to determine any pattern of
differences between the groups with respect to legal variables such as type of offense




Descriptive Statistics for Demographic and Legal Variables
________________________________________________________________
Feigning Group Honest Group
Variable M    SD M SD t or P2       p
________________________________________________________________
Age         31.52       8.95         35.61 8.63 -1.91      .06
Education         10.58    2.17         11.12    2.63 -.83      .41
Racea NA NA NA NA 2.1      .15
Type of Offensea NA NA NA NA .01      .94
Stage of Sentencinga NA NA NA NA .06      .81
________________________________________________________________
Note. NA = not applicable.
         a categorical variable with chi square statistic reported and group means 
          not applicable.
However, feigners and honest responders did score significantly different on
three of the four psychopathology subscales as measured by the SADS-C (see Table
6). Specifically, feigners scored higher on the Depression and Psychotic subscales and
lower on the Global Assessment Scale (GAS).  
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Table 6
Differences on SADS-C Subscales Between Feigners and Honest Responders 
________________________________________________________________
   SADS-C Feigning Group Honest Group
   Subscale    M     SD   M     SD   t      Cohen's d
________________________________________________________________
Depression 41.52    13.28 34.55  10.61 2.53*  .62
Psychotic 19.29      5.78 12.75    4.34 5.71**           1.40
Mania 11.33      6.36   8.52    3.98 1.93  .62
GAS 41.67      9.69 49.13  10.84 2.86**  .70
________________________________________________________________
Note.  *significant at the .05 level; **significant at the .01 level
Criterion Groups 
In the disordered sample, the MacCAT-CA classified 22 participants (27.8%)
as incompetent and 57 participants (72.2%) as competent to stand trial.  With respect
to the individual scales of the MacCAT-CA, the Understanding, Appreciation, and
Reasoning scales respectively classified 16.5%, 10.1%, and 19% of the participants as
incompetent.  The GCCT-MSH classified only 7 participants  (8.9%) as incompetent
and classified 72 participants (91.1%) as competent.  No participants were classified as
incompetent on the GCCT without a corresponding classification on the MacCAT-CA. 
Therefore, the final classification combining the GCCT and the MacCAT-CA was 22
(27.8%) incompetent participants and 57 (72.2%) competent competent participants.    
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Scale Reliability
Interrater reliability was computed for each scale of the three competency
measures as well as for the total score.  All three competency measures demonstrated
excellent inter-rater reliability with correlation coefficients ranging from .94 to 1.0 for the
GCCT, from .92 to .99 for the MacCAT-CA, and from .90 to 1.0 for the ECST (see
Table 7).  Based on these reliability estimates, data on competency measures were
considered sufficiently reliable to proceed with Research Questions.  
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Table 7
Inter-Rater Reliability for the GCCT-MSH, MacCAT-CA, and ECST-R
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Competency Factual Rational Ability to Consult                 Total
Measure Understanding Understanding with Counsel
___________________________________________________________________________________________
GCCT .99    .95          1.00                          .94
MacCAT – CA .99    .92   .97                          .99




The first research question asked whether there is evidence of convergent
and discriminant validity across competency measures for the three prongs of the
Dusky standard.  A multitrait-multimethod matrix (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) was
produced to examine the convergent and discriminant validity for each prong of the
Dusky standard via Pearson product-moment correlations (see Table 8).  Using the
standards of Fiske and Campbell (1992), the minimally adequate level of convergent
validity was .30.  As reported in Table 9, modest convergent validity was established for
factual understanding (.35).  However, adequate convergent validity was not
established for the Rational Understanding (.21) and the Ability to Consult with Counsel
(.00) prongs of the Dusky standard. 
Utilizing the criteria established by Bagozzi and Yi (1991), a low level of
discriminant validity was found for factual understanding, rational understanding, and
ability to consult with counsel (comparison violations = 38.9%, 50.0%, and 77.8%
respectively).  With respect to factual understanding, there was low discriminant validity
overall.  However, there was moderate evidence of discriminant validity when
comparing the average convergent validity coefficient to the heterotrait-monomethod
correlations (comparison violations = 33.3%).  Discriminant validity was low with respect
to the heterotrait-heteromethod correlation coefficients (comparison violations = 41.6%). 
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Table 8
Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix for Establishing the Construct Validity of the GCCT, MacCAT-CA, and ECST
___________________________________________________________________________________________
    GCCT      MacCAT-CA                ECST
  Factual   Rational   Assist     Factual   Rational   Assist Factual   Rational   Assist
___________________________________________________________________________________________
GCCT
     Factual           (.61)
     Rational  .26**        (.58)
     Assist Counsel .33*        .30*      (NA)  
MacCAT
     Factual .51*       .39*      .33*      (.82)
     Rational .39*           .17       .16       .38*        (.76)
     Assist Counsel .47*       .31*      .14       .69*         .28**       (.76)
ECST
     Factual .28**         .50*      .40*       .25** .07          .31* (.82)
     Rational .11       .00      -.13       .09 .46*         .07 -.11            (.73)
     Assist Counsel   -.15      -.09      -.08      -.01           .18         -.07 -.12             .52*         (.82)
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Note. Alpha Coefficients (monotrait-monomethod) are the numbers in parentheses on the principal diagonal; 
For the three prongs of the Dusky standard:  Factual = factual understanding; Rational = rational understanding;
Assist = ability to consult with counsel; NA = not applicable as scale only included one item; * significant at the .01 level; ** significant
at the .05 level.
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Table 9
Correlation Coefficients for Convergent and Discriminant Validity  
___________________________________________________________________________________________   
Discriminant Validity                                                                 
                                                                                         
  Heterotrait-   Heterotrait- Comparison
Dusky Prong       Convergent Validity Monomethod Heteromethod   Violations    
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Factual Understanding  .35 .24 .24                       38.9%
Rational Understanding .21 .27 .17                             50.0%




Research Question #2 addressed which of the competency measures had 
the best construct validity for determining competency to stand trial.  Method effects
was used to test this research question with systematic comparisons on the GCCT,
MacCAT-CA, and the ECST.  Table 10 summarizes the convergent validity,
discriminant validity, and comparison violations for each competency measure.  
Convergent Validity
For factual understanding, the ECST had the lowest convergent validity
coefficient (r = .27), followed by the MacCAT-CA (r = .38) and the GCCT ( r = .40).  For
rational understanding, the GCCT had the lowest convergent validity coefficient (r = .09)
followed by the ECST (r = .23) and the MacCAT-CA (r = .32).  The ECST, MacCAT-CA,
and the GCCT all had low convergent validity coefficients (r = -.07, .04, .03 respectively)
for the ability to consult with counsel prong.  
Discriminant Validity 
Utilizing the criteria established by Bogozzzi and Yi (1991), the GCCT
demonstrated a moderate level of discriminant validity for factual understanding;
however it exhibited a low level of discriminant validity for rational understanding and
the ability to consult with counsel.  The MacCAT-CA exhibited moderate
discriminant validity for factual and rational understanding,
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Table 10
Method Effects for the GCCT-MSH, MacCAT-CA, and ECST-R
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Measure Convergent Validity            Discriminant Validity                    Comparison 
Heterotrait-           Heterotrait- Violations
Monomethod              Heteromethod
___________________________________________________________________________________________
GCCT-MSH
Factual .40     .30 .21 25.0%
Rational .09     .30 .28 75.0%
Counsel .03     .30 .19          100.0%
MacCAT-CA
Factual .38     .45 .20 25.0%
Rational .32     .45 .20            25.0%
Counsel .04     .45 .29          100.0%
ECST-R
Factual .27     .10 .32 75.0%
Rational .23     .10 .04   0.0%
Counsel           -.07            .10                   -.02 25.0%
___________________________________________________________________________________________
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yet only a low level of discriminant validity for the ability to consult with counsel prong. 
The ECST-R demonstrated high discriminant validity for the rational understanding
prong and moderate discriminant validity for the ability to consult with counsel prong. 
However, low discriminant validity was established for the factual understanding prong. 
These data are reported in Table 10.  
Research Question #3
The third research question investigated the relative contributions of psychotic
and mood symptoms to the prediction of defendants' competency to stand trial.  This
question was on criterion groups using sociodemographic and clinical variables to
predict competency classification via discriminant analysis.    
Levels of Psychopathology in the Criterion Groups
Competent and Incompetent defendants did not differ significantly on SADS-C
depression, mania, or psychotic subscales (see Table 11).  However, the incompetent
group (M = 43.64, SD = 11.16) did score significantly lower than the competent group
(M = 51.25, SD = 10.02) on the GAS which is an indicator of overall level of impairment. 
With GAS scores < 40 signifying “major impairment”, incompetent defendants were
much more likely to score in this range (12 or 54.5%) than their competent counterparts
(8 or 14.0%; P2 = 13.78, p = .000).  
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Table 11 
Differences on SADS-C Subscales for Competent and Incompetent Defendants
___________________________________________________________________________________________
       Competent     Incompetent
          (n = 57)                                     (n = 22)              
Subscale                                   M SD M SD t                      d  
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Depression 34.89           10.82        33.62a 11.65  -.47              .12
Psychotic 12.12  3.91        14.36   5.04 1.88               .53
Mania   8.39  3.71          8.86   4.68   .48               .12
GAS 51.25           10.02        43.64 11.16 -2.93*             .74 
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Note. GAS = Global Assessment Scale;  * significant at the .01 level.  
          a Only 21 incompetent participants were included in this analyses due to missing data.
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Discriminant Analysis
To further test Research Question 3, the SADS-C subscales were used as
predictors of competency in a stepwise discriminant analysis.  To test whether these
subscales have incremental validity over sociodemographic variables, three analysis
were performed: (a) sociodemographic variables only (i.e., age, education), (b) clinical
variables only (i.e., subscales of the SADS-C and GAS) and (c) a combination of
sociodemographic and clinical variables.    
The discriminant function on the sociodemographic variables was statistically
nonsignificant (Wilk’s lambda = .996; p = .591).  In contrast, discriminant function
analysis on clinical variables only was significant (Wilk’s lambda = .83, p = .001) and
accurately classified 76.9% of the participants (see Table 12).  Its utility estimates were
PPP = .80, NPP = .62, sensitivity = .91, and specificity = .38.  Only two clinical variables
entered the function: GAS (canonical correlation = .75) and depression (canonical
correlation = .12).  
The discriminant function with both clinical and sociodemographic variables
(Wilk’s lambda = .85, p = .002; see Table 12) was comparable to clinical variables
alone.  The two variables that entered were GAS (Canonical Correlation = .73) and
depression (Canonical Correlation = .15).  Likewise, utility estimates were similar to
clinical variables: PPP = .80; NPP = .67; sensitivity = .93; and specificity = .38.  Addition
of the sociodemographic variables did not improve classification.  
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Table 12
Discriminant Analyses with Clinical and Sociodemographic Variables for the






Competent 57      52             5
     91.2%        8.8%
Incompetent 21      13           8
     61.9%      38.1%
    Canonical correlation of .41; Wilks' lambda of .83, p = .001
    Overall classification rate of 76.9%
Clinical and Sociodemographic Variables
Competent 57       53       4
      93.0%             7.0%
Incompetent 20       13       8
      61.9%          38.1%
     Canonical correlation of .39; Wilks' lambda of .85, p = .002
     Overall classification rate of 78.2%
_______________________________________________________________
Note.  Due to missing data, the n for the incompetent group is less than the expected
22 participants for these analysis.  
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Research Question #4
Research Question #4 addressed effectiveness of the E-APS and the G-APS as
screens for feigning.  
Psychometric Properties of the Feigning Screens
The ECST Atypical Presentation Scale (E-APS) has five subscales: (a) Realistic
Problems (e.g., do you wish your lawyer would spend more time with you?), (b) Non-
psychotic Symptoms, (c) Psychotic Symptoms, (d) Symptom Selectivity, and (e)
Symptom Severity.  A total score was also calculated for the E-APS and included in the
analysis. The E-APS subscales (see Table 13) showed modest to excellent internal
consistency with alpha coefficients ranging from .55 to .92.  In addition, the E-APS
demonstrated superb reliability with correlation coefficients above .94 for all subscales. 
The GCCT-MSH Atypical Presentation Scale (G-APS) demonstrated excellent
inter-rater reliability and modest internal consistency.  With respect to internal
consistency, the G-APS had a Chronbach’s alpha of .74.  Pearson’s product moment









ECST - Psychotic Symptoms .76 .94
ECST - Realistic Symptoms .59 .96
ECST - Non-psychotic Symptoms .55 .96
ECST - Selectivity .80          1.00
ECST - Severity .89 .99
ECST - Total Score .92          1.00
________________________________________________________________
Note. For internal consistency, " = Chronbach's alpha; For inter-rater reliability, r =
Pearson’s product moment correlations.
Utility of Atypical Presentation Scales as Screens for Feigning
Feigners scored significantly above honest responders on all scales of the E-
APS (see Table14).  The only exception was Realistic Problems subscale that was
comprised primarily of filler items to reduce the transparency of the E-APS.  All other
scales on the E-APS demonstrated strong effect sizes.  
61
Table 14
Mean Difference Statistics for the Atypical Presentation Scales on the ECST
________________________________________________________________
            Feigning Group      Honest Group
Scale   M     SD        M        SD t    Cohen's d
________________________________________________________________
ECST - Realistic Problems 13.14    2.63     11.72    3.24      1.85   .46
ECST - Psychotic symptoms   5.67    3.98       1.78    2.16      4.31*  1.47
ECST - Nonpsychotic symptoms   4.48    2.86       1.81    1.99      4.94* 1.21
ECST - Severity of symptoms   8.76    6.09       4.37    4.23      3.11*    .94
ECST - Selectivity of symptoms 14.00    4.06       9.24    3.16      5.77* 1.42
ECST - Total Score 42.80  19.74     25.87  13.86      4.43* 1.11
________________________________________________________________
Note.  *significant at the .01 level
On the G-APS, feigners scored significantly higher than honest responders (t = 3.62, p < .01).  On average,
feigners scored 5.10 (SD = 4.01) while honest responders averaged 1.77 (SD = 2.49).  The effect size for the G-APS was
robust (d = 1.16).     
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Utility estimates were obtained for each scale by using cut scores that maximized
NPP (i.e., > .80) and sensitivity (i.e., > .50).  These estimates are most important
because a screen should have moderate accuracy at identifying potential feigners
(sensitivity) and miss very few people that are feigning (NPP).  Optimal cut scores and
corresponding utility estimates for each of the Atypical Presentation Scales of the E-
APS and the G-APS are presented in Table 15.  All E-APS scales demonstrated
excellent NPP with all coefficients higher than .85.  Sensitivity of the E-APS scales
ranged from moderate (.52) to excellent (.80).     
The optimal cut score for the G-APS was > 3.  This cut score is markedly
different from the cut score of > 6 recommended by Gothard et al. (1995).  The current
cut score resulted in excellent NPP (.92) and modest sensitivity (.76).  The utility
estimates for the G-APS can be found in Table 15.   
Table 15
Utility Estimates for the G-APS and E-APS Subscales
________________________________________________________________
Scale                         Cut     Sensitivity Specificity PPP      NPP        Hit rate
________________________________________________________________
G-APS      3       .76     .77 .47      .92  .79
E-APS- Psychotic      5       .52     .95 .73      .87 .86
E-APS- Nonpsychotic   4       .67     .81 .48      .90 .78
E-APS- Realistic    13       .62     .57 .28      .85 .58
E-APS- Selectivity    11       .76     .68 .39      .92 .70
E-APS- Severity      5       .71     .57 .31      .88 .60
E-APS- Total Score    28       .80     .60 .34      .92 .62
________________________________________________________________  
Note. Cut = Cut Score (numbers > signify feigning); 




Over the past four decades, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the
Dusky standard with only minor elaborations as the substantive standard for
establishing competency to stand trial.  During this time, psychologists have become
considerably more involved in the assessment of competency to stand trial.  To this
end, several forensic measures assessing defendants’ competency have been
developed.  However, research is generally lacking support for the construct validity of
these competency measures as they pertain to Dusky.  
This chapter reviews the current results regarding the construct validity of three
recent competency measures in relationship to past studies.  In addition, current
findings regarding the relationship between psychopathology and competency are
discussed.  The chapter also offers an analysis of available methods of screening
defendants for feigning in light of the current data.    
Construct Validity of the Dusky Standard
Standardization vs. Relevance  
A main issue regarding the use of forensic measures in competency evaluations
is the conflict between standardization and relevance to the legal standard.  Some
professionals advocate the use of standardized forensic measures (Matarazzo, 1990),
while some professionals doubt their relevance to the legal standard (Faust & Ziskin,
1988).  This conflict is evident in that mental health professionals differ in their views on
the utility of forensic measures in evaluations of competency to stand trial.  Borum and
Grisso (1995) found that only 36% of forensic psychologists reported almost always
64
using forensic measures while a comparable percentage reported never using them.  
Compounding the debate among psychologists is the lack of substantial
research demonstrating the validity of such measures in relation to the Dusky standard. 
A systematic analysis of current competency measures as they pertain to Dusky is
warranted.  Research supporting the legal relevance of these forensic measures will
facilitate the resolution of the conflict between standardization and relevance. 
Furthermore, such research may encourage more forensic psychologists to employ
forensic measures in competency to stand trial (CST) assessments.  
Operationally Def ining Dusky 
Debate over the conceptualization of Dusky likely contributed to the lack of
substantial research on the construct validity of CST measures.  As described in the
Introduction, several conceptualizations of the Dusky standard are proposed by mental
health professionals and legal scholars (Melton et al., 1997; Otto et al., 1998; Rogers &
Grandjean, 2000; Shuman, 1996).  Although clinicians and lawyers agree that Dusky
requires an evaluation of the defendant's current capacities, debate continues over how
to operationally define those capacities with respect to the basic components (i.e.,
prongs) of Dusky.  However, most clinicians utilize a three-prong standard for
competency (i.e., factual understanding, rational understanding, and ability to consult
with counsel).  Therefore, this study examines the construct validity based on the three-
prong conceptualization.      
Convergent and Discriminant Validity of the Three Prongs of Dusky 
The multitrait-multimethod design utilized in the current study provided a
theoretically based, systematic method for evaluating the construct validity of current
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competency measures as they pertain to the three prongs of Dusky.  Modest construct
validity was found for factual understanding, however, statistical analysis failed to
establish construct validity for rational understanding or ability to consult with counsel. 
These negative findings were disheartening on several levels.  In general terms,
modern CST measures failed to adequately address 2 of the 3 prongs of Dusky.  More
specifically, these capacities that are unmistakably crucial to a defendant (e.g., ability to
consult with counsel) were not sufficiently validated.  According to Bonnie (1992), it
“would undermine society’s independent interest in the reliability of its criminal process .
. . to proceed against a defendant who lacks the capacity to recognize and
communicate relevant information to his or her attorney. . .” (p. 295).  It could be argued
that trusting one's attorney may be the most important capacity for a defendant to
possess as his attorney is his or her established link to courtroom proceedings. 
However, the current results suggest that current competency measures to not address
this prong of Dusky.  
A second prong of Dusky, not adequately validated is “rational understanding”. 
The vital necessity for a defendant’s rational understanding is evident by the gravity of
the trial situation and the defendant’s needed input.  A defendant lacking rational
understanding would not be engaged in the proceedings meaningfully and thus not
contributing to his or her own defense.  An attorney would be challenged to provide
proper defense to a disengaged defendant that cannot rationally grasp the finality of
judicial process. 
Validity of Factual Understanding Prong  
Factual understanding demonstrated modest construct validity in the current
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study.  Statistically, it was the only prong of the Dusky standard with an average
convergent validity coefficient that exceeded the discriminant validity coefficients.  In the
following paragraphs, three reasons are explored for the discrepancy in construct
validity between factual understanding and the other two prongs of Dusky.  
First, factual understanding of the proceedings (e.g., knowing the roles of
individuals in the courtroom) lends itself to clearer methods of assessing than the other
prongs of the Dusky standard because the information can be elicited via face-valid
items (e.g., What does the judge do?).  In contrast, rational understanding  (e.g.,
comprehending the gravity of one's position in the proceedings) and ability to consult
with counsel (e.g., trusting one's attorney) are more difficult to assess.  These prongs
assess the defendant's internal belief system and not merely his or her level of acquired
information regarding the legal process.  Internal belief systems are not as easily
elicited from face-valid items, such as a defendant's factual knowledge.  The similarity
of items across measures for assessing factual understanding provides evidence of this
argument.
A second reason is that rational understanding and ability to consult with counsel
typically involve case-specific information about the individual case and a particular
defense counsel.  Unlike factual understanding, the information that needs to be elicited
to assess the other two prongs varies with each individual defendant.  As a result, the
competency measures take different approaches when eliciting this information.  As an
example concerning the ability to consult with counsel prong, the ECST-R asks specific
questions regarding different aspects of the defendant's relationship with his or her
attorney.  On the other hand, the MacCAT-CA does not focus on the defendant's
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personal relationship with his own attorney.  Instead, it elicits the defendant's opinions
regarding a hypothetical defendant and his or her decisions while communicating with
the hypothetical attorney (see Table 16).  Finally, the GCCT only includes one item that
could elicit issues of potential mistrust in one's attorney (i.e., How can you help your
lawyer defend you?).  This heterogeneity in the assessment of ability to consult with
counsel may explain the poor convergence across measures in establishing construct
validity.  
Table 16
Methods Used by CST Measures to Assess Rational Understanding and Ability to
Consult with Counsel Prongs of Dusky
________________________________________________________________
CST Measure Methods used to assess          Methods used to assess
rational understanding        ability to consult with counsel 
prong       prong
________________________________________________________________
GCCT 2 items addressing nature of
charge and possible
consequences
1 item: “How could you help your
attorney defend you?”
MacCAT-CA 6 items requiring defendant to
compare his position to other
defendants in legal system  
8 items pertaining to hypothetical
case and assumed relationship
to an attorney
ECST 10 questions addressing ability
to make decisions  
15 items regarding nature of
client-attorney relationship
________________________________________________________________
A third explanation for the failure of CST measures to establish good construct
validity is that rational understanding and consult with counsel are closely related.  Both
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require rational abilities.  Evidence of their closely related abilities is provided by each
measure’s significant heterotrait-monomethod correlation coefficients.  For example,
the MacCAT-CA’s factual understanding scale was correlated with its rational
understanding scale (r = .38) and its ability to consult with counsel scale (r = .69).  The
interdependence of scales within a measure makes it difficult to establish good
discriminant validity as the heterotrait-monomethod correlation coefficients will be high. 
The presence of closely related constructs contributed to the failure in establishing
construct validity.  
In summary, construct validity was not established for the “rational
understanding” and “ability to consult with counsel” prongs of Dusky.  Explanations for
this failure includes the heterogeneity of methods for assessing rational understanding
and consult-with-counsel prongs.  Furthermore, the high  inter-scale correlations
between these prongs mitigate against construct validity via the MTMM research
design.          
Implications for Competency to Stand Trial Evaluations
Evidence of modest construct validity for factual understanding and failure to
establish construct validity for the other two prongs of Dusky suggest the need for an
alternative method of assessing competency.  Specifically, results of this study suggest
that modern CST measures are useful in making determinations of competency that are
relevant to factual understanding, but not to the other prongs of the Dusky.  
An initial assessment of factual understanding is suggested.  It could be
completed in a brief amount of time as CST measures do an adequate job of identifying
incompetency on this prong.  If a defendant was found to be incompetent with respect
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to factual understanding, he or she is incompetent overall as the prongs of Dusky are
interrelated and conjunctive (Shuman, 1994).  If a defendant has adequate factual
understanding, the mental health professional would need to further assess to establish
rational understanding and ability to consult with counsel.  Clinicians are urged to
conduct an indepth evaluation with probes and open-ended questions.  Because
construct validity was not established for these two prongs, standardization may need
to be sacrificed in lieu of adherence to the legal standard.  
Reliability and Validity of Modern Competency Measures
This section will address the psychometric properties of each measure
investigated in this study with respect to the other measures.  Please refer to Table 17
for a comprehensive comparison of these measures.  
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Table 17
Summary of Psychometric Properties of Competency Measures Investigated
___________________________________________________________________________________________
  # of items     Inter-rater        Internal          Convergent       Discriminant            
           Reliability          Consistency          Validity           Validity      
___________________________________________________________________________________________
GCCT      
     Factual 14   .99 .61    .40 moderate
     Rational   2   .95  .58    .09     low
     Assist   1 1.00 NA    .03     low
MacCAT-CA      
    Factual  8   .99 .82    .38 moderate
     Rational  6   .92 .76    .32 moderate
     Assist  8   .97 .76    .04     low
ECST-R
     Factual 15   .93 .82    .27     low
     Rational 10 1.00 .73    .23     high




The internal consistency of each scale corresponding to Dusky were examined
for all three measures.  As alpha coefficients should be considered with respect to the
number of items on each scale, both of these estimates are presented in Table 17.  On
the GCCT, modest alpha coefficients were found for factual and rational understanding. 
However, the rational understanding scale was comprised of only two items, thus
limiting estimates of internal consistency.  Furthermore, scale reliability estimates were
not applicable for ability to consult- with-counsel scale of the GCCT because only one
item comprised the scale.  
All scales of the MacCAT-CA and ECST-R demonstrated modest to good
internal reliability (see Table 17).  These internal consistency estimates were examined
with respect to the number of items on each scale.  Reliability estimates for rational
understanding were lower than for the other two scales.  With respect to the MacCAT-
CA, this may be the result of the hypothetical basis of the factual understanding and
ability to consult with counsel prongs.  As these scales are not case-specific and thus
not representative of Dusky, the internal consistency of these scales may be artificially
inflated with respect to competency. 
Inter-rater Reliability  
Excellent inter-rater reliability was demonstrated for all three measures with
correlation coefficients > .90.  Inter-rater reliability estimates were computed separately
for each prong of Dusky as well as for the measures total score (see Table 17). 
72
Construct Validity 
With respect to construct validity, the GCCT performed worse than the other two
competency measures.  Construct validity was not established for two of the three
scales through either inspection of face validity or systematic comparisons with the
other measures.  With respect to the other measures,  adequate convergent validity
and discriminant validity was established for factual understanding.  However, the
multitrait-multimethod design failed to establish adequate construct validity for rational
understanding or the ability to consult with counsel prongs of Dusky.  This result is not
surprising due to the limited number of items included in these two scales.  As the
GCCT does not have standardized subscales that correspond to Dusky, subscales
were created via a face-valid assessment of items.  However, with respect to rational
understanding, only two items adequately addressed the issues suggested by Dusky. 
Furthermore, only one item addressed the defendant’s ability to consult with counsel.
Construct validity of the MacCAT-CA and ECST-R differed considerably by
scale.  With respect to factual understanding, the MacCAT-CA was similar to the GCCT
in that adequate convergent validity was established and a moderate level of
discriminant validity.  The ECST-R did not perform as well as the other measures on
factual understanding because (a) its convergent validity coefficient was significantly
lower than other measures and (b) low discriminant validity was established.    
The ECST-R performed significantly better than the other two measures with
respect to the “consult-with-counsel” prong.  Although convergent validity coefficients
were low for all three measures, the ECST-R had significantly lower discriminant validity
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coefficients.  Comparison violation analysis revealed a moderate level of discriminant
validity for the ECST-R as contrasted with low discriminant validity for the other two
measures.  
The ECST-R also performed better than the other two measures with respect to
rational understanding.  As previously stated the GCCT had low convergent and
discriminant validity for rational understanding; it performed worse than the ECST-R
and MacCAT-CA.  With respect to convergent validity, the MacCAT-CA performed
slightly better than the ECST-R (.32 vs. .23).  However, the ECST-R had high
discriminant validity while the MacCAT-CA had only moderate discriminant validity.  The
ECST-R’s heterotrait-mononmethod correlation coefficients were low as were it
heterotrait-heteromethod correlation coefficients.  As discussed in the next section, the
MacCAT-CA’s heterotrait-monomethod correlation coefficients were too high to
demonstrate good discriminant validity (refer to Table 9 for convergent and discriminant
validity coefficients).  
Inter-Scale Correlations  
One problem with establishing the construct validity of these measures was the
significant intercorrelations between scales within measures (i.e., heterotrait-
monomethod correlations).  This problem was especially true for the GCCT and the
MacCAT-CA.  For example, all three scales of the GCCT evidenced significant
intercorrelations.  This finding suggests that the GCCT is assessing one rather than
three separate dimensions of competency.   
MacCAT-CA 
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Construct validity was difficult to establish for the MacCAT-CA due to its
moderately high heterotrait-monomethod correlation coefficients.  Specifically, the
MacCAT-CA had a high average heterotrait-monomethod correlation coefficient (r =
.45) which resulted in poor discriminant validity.  Poor construct validity resulted as this
discriminant validity coefficient exceeded the average convergent correlation
coefficients for each prong of the Dusky standard.  The high heterotrait-monomethod
correlation is primarily the result of the high correlation (r = .69) between factual
understanding (i.e., Understanding Scale) and ability to consult with counsel (i.e.,
Reasoning Scale).  These two prongs are assessed via a hypothetical story while the
third prong is not.  This finding suggests that the MacCAT-CA may be measuring two
independent capacities: (a) the defendant's ability to think abstractly and (b) rational
understanding.  Furthermore, the reliance of the MacCAT-CA on a hypothetical story
contradicts the basic notion of Dusky that assessment of a defendant’s psycholegal
abilities be case-specific.    
ECST-R
Of the three competency measures that were investigated, the ECST-R
demonstrated the lowest intercorrelations (r  = .10) among the three scales assessing
the three prongs of the Dusky standard.  Low heterotrait-monomethod correlation
coefficients suggest that the ECST-R has excellent discriminant validity with respect to
its own scales.  This low correlation coefficient greatly contributed to the success of
ECST-R at assessing rational understanding (comparison violation = 0%) and ability to
consult-with-counsel (comparison violation = 25.0%).  Opposed to the other measures
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investigated, the ECST was developed specifically so that it would be relevant to
Dusky.  Results of this study support the construct validity of two prongs of the Dusky
standard that had previously been neglected in the literature.   Although low convergent
validity was found with respect to the other measures, the implications of this finding is
unclear as the previously discussed measures did not exhibit good construct validity. 
Relationship Between Competency and Psychopathology
Importance of Psychopathology in Competency Recommendations
Incompetency rarely occurs without the presence of either a diagnosis of
psychosis or evidence of severe impairment due to organic mental disorder or mental
retardation (Golding, 1992).  Results of this study indicated that approximately 75% of
the defendants could be accurately classified as competent or incompetent based on
clinical variables alone.  These findings suggest that comprehensive competency
evaluations must include an assessment of psychopathology in addition to psycholegal
abilities.  Furthermore, it is necessary for clinicians to understand the contributing
factors to incompetency in order to make qualified determinations of competency.     
Prediction of Competency Using Sociodemographic Variables
  Ustad et al. (1996) established that socio-demographic variables, such as age
and race, were not correlated with competency decisions as determined the GCCT-
MSH.  Furthermore, Hart and Hare (1992) found no evidence of a race or age bias in
decisions of competency.  Results of this study are consistent with past research in that
sociodemographic (i.e., age race, education) variables did not accurately predict
competency.  Furthermore legal variables (e.g., type of crime) was not related to
76
competency as well.  
Prediction of Competency Using Clinical Variables
Nicholson and Kugler (1991) reviewed 30 studies on CST and established two
clinical categories that consistently predict competency: (a) a diagnosis of psychosis
and (b) psychiatric symptoms reflective of severe psychopathology.  Results of the
current discriminant analyses support the findings of Nicholson and Kugler.  The current
discriminant analysis included three clinical scales (i.e., psychosis, depression, and
mania) from the SADS-C.  They established psychotic symptoms as the best predictor
of competency with an overall classification rate of 70.9%.  This finding is consistent
with past research (Hart & Hare, 1992; Nicholson & Kugler, 1991; Ustad et al., 1996). 
Overall impairment due to psychopathology is the key factor in predicting
incompetency.  When functional impairment (as measured by the GAS of the SADS-C)
was added to the discriminant analysis, it became the strongest predictor of
competency.  Psychosis and depression contributed to the prediction of incompetency
as well.  Interestingly, the GAS was significantly correlated with both psychosis ( r = -
.57) and depression ( r = -.52).  This finding suggests that it is the impairment rather
than the specific disorder is important in determining competency.  This finding is
consistent with the conclusions of Nicholson and Kugler (1991) that “severe
psychopathology” plays a key role in determining competency. 
In addition to results of the discriminant analyses, t tests (see Table 11) indicate
that functional impairment is the key in differentiating between competent and
incompetent defendants.  Group differences were established for GAS, but not for any
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clinical scale.  With respect to predicting competency, Ustad et al. (1996) concluded
that the combination of a defendant’s low IQ and the presence of a severe mental
disorder best predicts incompetency.  As this combination of factors would undoubtably
adversely affect a defendant’s level of functioning, current results appear to be
consistent with those of Ustad et al.
Implications for the Assessment of Competency  
Results of this study lend credence to the recommendations of Hart and Hare
(1992) regarding a change in the method of assessing competency.  Specifically,
perhaps a first step in competency evaluations is to screen for psychosis.  Research
consistently demonstrates psychotic symptoms as a predictor of competency. 
Furthermore, research suggests that few nonpsychotic defendants are also found
incompetent to stand trial.  Although the diagnosis of psychotic symptoms would not
suffice for a decision of competency, a brief competency screen could then be
administered to nonpsychotic defendants.  For psychotic defendants, a more indepth
assessment of impaired competency due to psychosis would be warranted.  As the
ECST has more items addressing these issues, this measure is strongly recommended
for psychotic defendants.  Although assessing for psychotic symptoms is
recommended, clinicians are reminded that psychosis or other psychopathology does
not equate with incompetency (Golding, 1992).
Feigning and Competency Measures
Importance of Assessing for Feigning Incompetency 
“Criminals may seek to . . . avoid punishment by feigning incompetency to stand
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trial” (Resnick, 1997. p. 48).  Therefore, assessing for feigned incompetence is a
necessary component of any comprehensive CST evaluation. This requirement was
evident in the current study as approximately 20% of the total sample was classified as
feigning on the SIRS.  This proportion is slightly higher than Gothard et al. (1995), who
estimated 12.7% of CST defendants were feigning.  However, it buttresses the notion
that a significant minority of defendants will attempt to malinger.  
Psychometric Properties of Atypical Presentation Scales
Reliability  
The internal reliability of the atypical presentation scales was investigated by a
comparison of alpha coefficients between feigners, nonfeigners, and the total sample. 
As expected, internal consistency was higher with honest responders than with feigners
on the Realistic Problems subscale.  However, on all other E-APS subscales, internal
consistency was higher with feigners than honest responders.  Lower Cronbach’s
alphas for honest responders may be due to the limited range in their responses.
Overall, scale reliability was moderate to good for all of the atypical presentation scales
(see Table 13).  
Validity  
As expected, feigners scored "worse" on the atypical presentation scales (i.e.,
the five E-APS subscales and one G-APS scale).  The one exception was the Realistic
Problems Scale of the E-APS.  However, the purpose of this scale was to add filler
items to reduce the transparency of the E-APS rather than assist in the classification of
feigning.  In order to establish criterion-related validity, each atypical presentation scale
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was examined against the feigning category established by the SIRS.  Utility estimates
are necessary in order to examine each measure’s accuracy at approximating the
diagnostic standard.  The following section offers a discussion of each measure with
respect to its utility estimates.    
Clinical Applicability of Atypical Presentation Scales of CST Measures
GCCT
The G-APS  was designed as a brief screen.  The scale includes only 8 items
that can be administered in less than two minutes.  As a screen, the primary objective is
to identify potential feigners.  For this purpose, the pre-eminent concern is not miss
cases where feigning actually occurred (i.e., NPP).  The G-APS had an overall hit rate
of .79.  The G-APS accurately classified three-fourths of feigners (sensitivity = .76). 
Most importantly, its cut score missed very few feigners (i.e., 8.0%; NPP = .92). 
Although the utility of the G-APS as a screen for feigning was previously
established by Gothard (1995), that study utilized a very different cut score than the
present study.   Gothard et al. accurately classified approximately 90% of their sample
with a cut score > 6.  In the present study a cut score of > 3 was employed to achieve a
classification rate of 79%.  The research design differences in these two studies may
account for this discrepancy.  Specifically, Gothard et al. utilized a simulation design
while the current study was a known- groups comparison.  Known-groups comparisons
involve an evaluation of response styles under real-world conditions and thus have
more external validity than simulation designs (Rogers & Cruise, 1988).  The previously
established cut score (>6) appears too stringent for the current study. Psychologists are
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encouraged to utilize a lower cut score that will result in the classification of more
defendants as potentially feigning.  This is ideal as the purpose of the G-APS is solely
to screen defendants for feigning and is not intended to be used as the sole basis for
classification of malingering. 
ECST
Compared to the G-APS, the E-APS is much more sophisticated.  Specifically,
the E-APS consists of 6 subscales and employs four detection strategies as outlined by
Rogers (1997).  The present study is the first systematic evaluation of the E-APS scale
with the SIRS as a gold standard for feigning.  The overall scale demonstrated excellent
promise as a screen for feigned incompetence.  The E-APS had high accuracy when it
classified a defendant as responding honestly (NPP = .92).  Furthermore, the E-APS
was generally accurate when identifying feigners (sensitivity = .80).  
As cut scores were established with maximizing negative predictive power and
sensitivity, each subscale of the E-APS employed a different cut score (see Table 14). 
Each subscale of the E-APS demonstrated good to excellent NPP.  With respect to
sensitivity, utility estimates ranged from moderate (.52 on psychotic symptoms scale) to
good (.80 for total score).  As the total score demonstrated the highest NPP and
sensitivity, its use is recommended as a screen for feigning.  However, the overall hit
rate was only moderate (.62).  As a supplementary approach, the Psychotic Symptoms
Scale of the E-APS is recommended.  The overall hit rate was highest for the E-APS
Psychotic Symptoms Scale demonstrating its utility as a screening for feigning. 
Although it is recommended that these scales be included in any competency
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evaluation, the E-APS should not be used to make final judgements regarding feigning.
Strengths and Limitations of the Study
Methodological Considerations
A multi-trait multi-method design (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) was employed to
investigate construct validity of competency to stand trial.  This design requires different
methods of eliciting multiple constructs.  This research design is limited in the present
study because of the lack of distinct “methods”.  All measures investigated are semi-
structured interviews.  Despite this limitation, the model presented by Campbell and
Fiske (1959) seemed to provide the clearest method of assessing construct validity with
the present sample.  
A further complication to the multitrait-multimethod design was the content of the
measures themselves.  The scales of two measures did not adequately address the
Dusky standard.  Specifically, the GCCT does not have subscales corresponding to
Dusky.  As mentioned previously, development of these scales was limited by the low
number of items addressing rational understanding and ability to consult with counsel. 
With respect to the MacCAT-CA, two of its scales pertained to a hypothetical vignette
rather than the defendant’s case.  This use of hypotheticals is inconsistent with Dusky’s
requirement about capacities involving the defendant’s case.    
An investigation of construct validity requires good scale reliability and
discriminant validity between scales within a measure.  Although the scales of the
ECST-R and MacCAT-CA demonstrated excellent internal consistency, two scales of
the GCCT did not have good internal consistency.  Furthermore, high intercorrelation
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among scales on the MacCAT-CA resulted in poor discriminant validity for that measure
and jeopardized the construct validity of the other measures.  
Areas for Future Research
More research on the utility of competency measures and their relevance to
Dusky is needed.  This study is the first to systematically evaluate their relevance to the
legal standard.  To ensure a theory-based approach, studies involving the assessment
of any forensic issue should focus on the legal standard.  In addition to construct
validity, competency studies must also focus on criterion-related validity.  Several
limitations of criterion-related validity are present for competency evaluations.  With
CST assessments, identifying an objective “gold standard” for competency is difficult. 
Practitioners who make clinical decisions of competency often have access to
competency measures thus confounding the results through criterion contamination. 
Independent research by clinicians not involved in actual competency evaluations
would circumvent this problem.  
Prior research (Hare & Hart, 1992; Ustad et al., 1996) has demonstrated a
relationship between cognitive functioning and competency to stand trial.  The present
study did not investigate the importance of neuropsychological functioning deficits and
cognitive abilities in the prediction of competency.  As low intelligence is
disproportionately high in the penal system (Nicholson & Johnson, 1991), its impact on
a person's capacities, as outlined by Dusky needs to be investigated.    
Conclusions
Current results indicate that modern competency measures tend to assess for
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one prong of Dusky (i.e., factual understanding) better than the other prongs.  However,
two newer measures demonstrate some utility in assessing for the other prongs. 
Specifically, the MacCAT-CA shows promise in adequately assessing for rational
understanding.  The ECST-R appears effective at assessing a defendant’s ability to
consult with counsel.  As no measure demonstrated excellence in assessing for each
prong of Dusky, a CST evaluation including multiple competency measures is
recommended.  The following paragraphs address conclusions regarding each of the
measures examined.  
GCCT  
In general, the GCCT lacks direct relevance to the psycholegal capabilities
outlined in Dusky.  However, the GCCT’s total score has demonstrated moderate to
excellent internal reliability (Ustad et al., 1996), excellent inter-rater reliability
(Nicholson, 1992), and good criterion-related validity (Nicholson et al., 1988). 
Furthermore, results of this study indicate that the GCCT does an adequate job of
assessing for factual understanding and feigned incompetency.  Therefore, it is
suggested that the GCCT be utilized as a screening measure for the initial assessment
of competency to stand trial and feigning.  Clinicians are encouraged to supplement the
GCCT with additional methods of assessing the defendant’s rational understanding and
ability to consult with counsel.   
MacCAT-CA    
As two of the MacCAT-CA’s sections are reliant on a hypothetical court case, it
seems that those portions do not adequately assess the psycholegal abilities outlined in
84
Dusky.  It tests the defendant’s memory for details irrelevant to his or her own situation. 
It also attempts to equate the ability to think abstractly with his or her actual capabilities
to assist in his or her own defense.  The strength of the MacCAT-CA lies in the
assessment of rational understanding.  That is, the Appreciation Scale on the MacCAT-
CA requires the defendant to make comparative judgements regarding his or her own
legal situation and assesses their appreciation of possible consequences.  In sum, the
MacCAT-CA shows promise as a tool for assessing rational understanding, but it is
recommended that clinicians augment their evaluations with case specific questions
regarding the nature of the attorney-client relationship.   
ECST-R
The ECST-R demonstrated strong promise for a competency measure as it
focuses on the relevant legal standard, has the capacity to assess for the defendant’s
ability to learn, and can effectively screen for feigning.  The ECST’s demonstration of
discriminant validity is in sharp contrast to past CST measures as well as the other
measures investigated in this study.  The ECST performed better than the other
measures in the current study because of its focus on case-specific questions and
pertinent issues of psychopathology (e.g., psychosis). 
Psychopathology and Competency 
Consistent with prior research, certain clinical variables consistently predict
competency classifications.  Specifically, clinicians should focus on psychotic symptoms
and the level of overall impairment due to psychopathology.  Although this study did not
address intellectual functioning, intelligence undoubtedly affects functional impairment. 
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It is therefore recommended that clinicians assess for cognitive deficits when making
determinations of CST.
Feigning Incompetency  
Defendants may be tempted to feign disorders in order to be found incompetent
to stand trial (Rogers, 1997).  Results indicate that both the G-APS and the E-APS
have considerable promise in screening for feigned incompetency.  Final assessments
of feigning should not rely on these scales alone.  However, they could easily be
incorporated into any forensic evaluation as they both take less than 5 minutes to
administer.  It is therefore recommended that these scales be employed when
completing any CST evaluation.     
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTION OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND LEGAL VARIABLES FOR 
 FEIGNING AND HONEST GROUP
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Frequency of Demographic and Legal Variables for 
the Feigning and Honest Group
________________________________________________________________
Variable Categories Feigning Group       Honest Group
     n = 21 n = 79
________________________________________________________________
Race
Caucasian American 11 (52.4%) 56 (70.9%)
African American  7  (33.3%) 16 (20.3%)
Hispanic American  0 (00.0%)   6 (7.6%)
Bi-racial  3 (14.3%)   1 (1.3%)
Type of Offense
Violent Crimes  8 (38.1%)  32 (40.5%)
Non-violent Crimes 13 (61.9%) 46 (58.2%)
Stage of Sentencing
not yet sentenced 12 (57.1%) 50 (63.3%)
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